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THE  AGREEMENT REACHED  IN BRUSSELS on  February 9,  1971, 
to achieve full  economic and monetary union has been called 
"an event of historic  significance"  and  "a meaningless  com-
promise postponing essential decisions." To each his own. 
Everyone who knew the difficulties involved in  this venture 
was  sorry  to  see  the  revival  of old  quarrels  make  it  more 
complicated.  Those people  appreciate  the  importance  of the 
Council's decisions,  both  for  their  immediate  effects  as  well 
as  for  their significance  in  the  long-run. 
By giving full  approval to the Commission's February 1969 
proposals,  the  Council  lay  the  foundation  for  the  Commu-
nity's  economic  and  monetary organization.  To  improve  co-
ordination  of  economic  policies,  the  Community  now  has 
medium-term  guidelines  and  a  procedure  for  consultations 
between  the  member  countries  prior  to  their  national  eco-
nomic policy decisions.  The Community has been  given  ma-
chinery for monetary cooperation which rightfully belongs to 
it  and  which will  enable it  in  time  to  assert  its  individuality 
within the  international monetary system. 
In  its  resolution  on creating  an  economic  and  monetary 
union in  stages, the Council defined  a perspective, set princi-
ples,  and  drew  guidelines  for  action  which  will  govern  the 
Community's  development  in  this  decade.  The  Council  ex-
pressed  a firm  will  and  made specific commitments. The con-
cessions  made by  the  member states  to  reach  agreement  re-
sulted  from  their willingness  to  consider  each  other's  prob-
lems and not from  a search for a  mediocre compromise. For 
instance,  the  "escape  clause"  that  some  member  countries' 
wanted was written in terms that instead of inviting dismantle-
ment of the venture encourage its permanency. 
Finally,  by  showing  its  will  to  strengthen  its  cohesion  by 
progress in  the economic and monetary spheres, the Commu-
nity can prepare to welcome new members into circumstances 
that safeguard  its  nature, its  dynami~m, and  its  efficiency. 
Obstacles  will  still  arise  on  the  Community's  new  course. 
The strength of its  determination will  have to match the diffi-
culty of the tasks ahead: 
•  to  reconcile  economic  and  social  needs,  seeking  together 
solutions  that combine the  desire  for  efficiency  with  respect 
for  certain  particularly European  values 
•  to  share  more  and  more  fully  in  shaping  international 
events 
•  to give aid in  proportion to its wealth and its  means to the 
Third World. 
Nothing is ever sure of lasting. However, the Brussels agree-
ment provides new reasons for thinking that our old nations, 
which have been divided among themselves for too long, have 
decided  to  pursue unrelentingly,  but respecting  each  other's 
individualities,  the  construction  of  a  Community  that  can 
control its own destiny. 
Raymond  Barre,  Vice  President  of  the  European  Communities 
Commission,  developed  the  plan  for  achieving  economic  and 
monetary  union  by  1980. 
BARRE 
on the ''Barre Plan'' 
RAYMOND  BARRE 
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Economic and Monetary Union 
A PRACTICAL AGREEMENT WITH POLITICAL MEANING AND INTENT 
"Perhaps since the signing of the Treaty of Rome no choice has 
been of greater importance for  the future of the peoples and 
countries of the European Community." 
In these  words,  Commission  President Franco Maria Mal-
fatti summed up the agreement reached by the Council of Min-
isters at its February  8-9 meeting in  Brussels to go ahead with 
plans  for  achieving economic  and  monetary union  by  1980, 
possibly including a common currency. But the summation lost 
something of the excitement of the event. 
Two years had passed since the idea was first put forward in 
a memorandum from the Commission to the Council of Min-
isters, drafted UJider the supervision of Commission Vice Presi-
dent Raymond Barre. At the request of the Council, the idea 
was further developed in  a second Commission memorandum 
dated February 12,  1969. After debate in  the Council of Min-
isters, the national political authorities were asked to consider 
the idea within an ad hoc committee chaired by Luxembourg 
Minister of Finance Pierre Werner which reported back to the 
Council October 8,  1970. On the basis of both the "Barre Re-
port" and the "Werner Report," the Commission on October 30 
submitted to the Council the formal proposal for economic and 
monetary union. 
Little Substance lost 
In the Community process of submitting a radical idea to the 
scrutiny of sovereign states, it was amazing that so little of the 
original plan was lost, that the main parts were kept intact. 
The transfer of power to a supranational institution had been 
strongly recommended in  both the Barre and the  Werner re-
ports. While the final package deal did not achieve full transfer, 
it did remove one economic instrument, monetary policy, from 
the exclusive control of the six sovereign states by increasing the 
powers of the Committee of Central Bank Governors, an insti-
tution that was  not even mentioned in  the  Common Market 
Treaty and which came into existence only six  years after the 
Common Market began operating (see below). 
The other main economic instrument, fiscal  policy, remains 
largely in the hands of the member governments. 
The Package Deal 
The agreement reached on February 8-9 consists of five closely 
related elements: 
•  a decision providing for three Council meetings  a year on 
economic policy 
•  a  decision  adopting  the  third  Medium-Term  Economic 
Policy Program, covering 1971-75 
•  a  decision  creating  machinery  for  granting  medium-term 
financial aid to a member country having balance of payments 
difficulties 
•  a decision to strengthen monetary and credit policy coordi-
nation between the five  central banks (Belgium handles trans-
actions for the  Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union which 
antedated the Community.) 
•  a resolution outlining the goals and phases for achieving eco-
nomic and monetary union and expressing the member coun-
tries' political commitment to the plan. 
All but the second point will be formally adopted at another 
meeting,  after final  drafting in  the  Community's four official 
languages. 
The Council's Role 
According to the agreement, the Council will meet three times a 
year to evaluate the Community's economy. On the basis of a 
Commission proposal, the Council will  enact guidelines for the 
Community's overall cyclical policy and specific guidelines for 
each member country to follow to assure the Community's bal-
anced growth. 
At the first meeting every year, the Council will review eco-
nomic policy  of the  preceding  year.  At the  second  meeting, 
guidelines will be set for drafting the national budgets and for 
deciding on the size deficits that are advisable and the means of 
financing them. (In the past, several member countries, by over-
burdening the bond markets, have reduced the amount of capi-
tal  available  to finance  business  expansion and other private 
investments.) 
At the third meeting, the Council will adopt an annual report 
on the  Community's economy,  based on  a  Commission pro-
posal and the opinion of the European Parliament. Each mem-
ber government will then submit this report to its national legis-
lature for consideration  in debate and  action  on  its  national 
budget.  This  action  will  set a  precedent of asking  a national 
political body to think of the effects its actions will have on the 
Community as well as on its own country. 
Medium-Term Economic Policy a Key 
Passage  of the  Community's  third  Medium-Term  Economic 
Policy Program was a key to the entire package, as it set targets 
in  percentages for the main economic indicators for the Com-
munity  as  a whole  and for each member country.  The most 
sensitive of these  targets was the permissible rate of inflation; 
no member country wanted to face the prospect of having to 
help another member country finance  a  balance-of-payments 
deficit  due entirely to  "spendthrift" domestic policies.  Such  a 
situation would mean  a transfer of resources,  if only tempo-
rarily, to the deficit country from partner countries that were 
containing domestic inflation perhaps at the price of increases in unemployment, voters out of work. 
The  program  also  defined  structural  improvements  to  be 
made at both national and Community level. A mix of indus-
trial'policy, favoring the most productive investments, and of 
regional policy, aiding the most undeveloped areas, will be used. 
Medium-Term Financial Aid 
The medium-term economic policy deeision cleared the way 
for agreement on  the  draft decision  creating  machinery  for 
medium-term  monetary  support  which  had been  before  the 
Council since June 1970. This system, for use over periods of 
two to five  years, complements the short-term monetary sup-
port arrangements  activated in  February 1970 for aid of up 
to two years. 
To receive medium-term monetary support, a member state 
will have to  accept its  partners' advice about running its  na-
tional economy. Only a member country facing balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties of its own will be excused from participating 
in the joint rescue operation within the limits set:  $600 million 
for Germany and France; $200 million for the Belgium-Luxem-
bourg Economic Union, and $400 million for Italy. 
Initially, this  system will  apply for a  period of four years, 
beginning on January 1, 1972. It will be renewed automatically 
every five years unless a member country raises objections. This 
"escape  clause"  satisfied  some  member  countries  that  were 
reluctant to agree  to  medium-term  monetary support without 
a  central,  Community  authority  to  make  sure  debtors  took 
their partners' advice. 
Central Banks' Powers Strengthened 
While the decision on creating a central authority was deferred 
to 1975, the powers of the Committee of Central Bank Gover-
nors were considerably strengthened and "hotlines" installed in 
each central bank. This Committee, one of the Community's 
most  important,  most  informal,  and  most secret,  consists  of 
the five  men  who  are  responsible  for  daily  monetary  trans-
actions between the Six and with non-member countries. Since 
the central bankers face  the problem of deciding what to do 
with "hot money"-speculative capital that chases high inter-
est rates and increases domestic liquidity-they have a  stake 
in achieving policy coordination. 
The Committee was  in fact  a  child of necessity.  Six  years 
after the Common Market began operating, it was created by a 
Council decision in May 1964, after the Community's first bout 
of inflation had proven the need for policy coordination at the 
operational level. Through trade, excess demand quickly spread 
from one member country to another before the Community 
process could check it. 
Although  neither  the  Commission  nor  the  Community's 
Monetary Committee have seats on the Committee they have 
attended  the  central bankers' secret meetings  and have  been 
closely  associated  in  their work.  Without  this  close  ad  hoc 
collaboration and opportunity for free exchange of ideas, eco-
nomic and monetary union would still be a pipedream, as it far 
exceeds the provisions of the  Common Market Treaty.  (The 
Council recognized this situation in its resolution by stating that 
preparations  to  amend  the  Common  Market Treaty  should 
begin right away.) 
This close association of formal Community institutions with 
the Committee will continue under the economic and monetary 
union. Within  the context of guidelines to  be  passed by  the 
Council on the basis of a Commission proposal, the Committee 
of  Central  Bank  Governors  will  formulate  complementary 
policies for each central bank on liquidity trends, credit alloca-
tion terms, and interest rates. They have also been asked to de-
velop practical means of applying these policies. 
In addition, the central bankers have been "invited" in  the 
Council's resolution  to  reduce the  margins of fluctuation be-
tween their currencies in relation to the U.S. dollar so that they 
can form an "individual monetary unit within the international 
system, characterized by the total and irreversible convertibility 
of currencies." This statement challenges the U.S. dominance 
of the international monetary scene. 
The Draft Resolution 
"Economic and monetary union implies that the main economic 
policy decisions will be made at Community level, and therefore 
that the necessary powers will be transferred from the national 
to Community level," stated the resolution. This statement, one 
of the most difficult parts to fit  into the package failed to con-
vince some skeptics of the political will of the Six to see through 
this venture. While the Six did provide an "escape clause," al-
lowing an objection by any member country to block the re-
newal of the agreement on machinery for medium-term finan-
cial·aid, the Community's past experience, particularly with the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors, gives grounds for opti-
mism.  The Council itself expressed optimism by stating that 
during  the  first  phase,  the  de  facto,  practical  arrangements 
would be  tried out while the search for de  jure  solutions,  to 
solidify them into law, proceeded. 
No Important Omissions 
While  no outright deletions were made  from the original tax 
harmonization proposals made in  the Barre plan, the Werner 
Report, and the Commission's formal proposal, some specifics 
were  narrowed  or made  abstract,  less  compelling.  Thus,  for 
example, the Council resolution commits the member states to 
harmonizing the  base and scope of excise  duties,  but not to 
achieving uniform rates, as the Commission had proposed. Or, 
the Council resolution commits the Six to "further harmoniza-
tion of the structure of company taxation," rather than to the 
harmonization  of the  base,  as  proposed  by  the  Commission. 
The Six  did,  however,  renew  their commitment to  achieving 
a uniform turnover tax system for the tax on the value-added 
(TVA) which in Europe is a large source of tax revenue for the 
national  governments,  and eventually,  the  Community itself. 
Beginning in 1975, 1 per cent of the member states' TVA reve-
nue will accrue to the Commission. 
In short, the Six  have made a start, one that could not be 
imagined only five  years ago when France walked out of the 
Council chambers over the issue of majority voting. Six sover-
eign states, united 12 short years in a common effort to achieve 
a customs union, have recognized that to maintain this union 
some  national  prerogatives  have  to  be  modified.  They  have 
relinquished some control over their purse strings, but any re-
laxation  of control  over  national budgets,  taxes,  credit,  and 
money supply is  a difficult political choice, one that influences 
a voter's decision to buy a new car or wait until next year.  5 & 
New Free Trade  Drive Needed 
U.S.  CRIES  OF  "ECONOMIC  DISADVANTAGES"  ARE  UNFOUNDED 
RALF  DAHRENDORF 
FORMAL  AND  INFORMAL  AMERICAN  COMPLAINTS  about  the 
Community's trade  policy  have  multiplied  since  1968.  They 
do  not  become  more  justified  because  repeated  frequently. 
The much quoted "economic disadvantages" which the United 
States is  ready, or no longer ready, to put up with in exchange 
for long-term political advantages, do not exist at all. 
The total volume of trade between the Community and the 
United States in  1969 was  $13  billion, and it rose sharply in 
1970.  For the first  nine  months of the  year,  the increase  in 
the  Community's  imports  from  the  United  States  was  24.5 
per cent, while  the rise  in  Community exports to the United 
States  was  9.3  per  cent.  The  determining  feature  of trade 
relations  between  the  Community  and  the  United  States  is 
the  Community's  trade  deficit.  Since  the  Community  was 
established, this deficit has virtually always been considerably 
higher than $1  billion a year. 
The  total  volume  of  direct  American  investment  in  the 
Community has attained $10 billion, in  terms of book value, 
compared  with  direct  European  investments  in  the  United 
States of $3  billion. 
American trade with the Community has almost tripled be-
tween  1958  and  1970.  This  advance  is  considerably  faster 
than  the  growth of America's trade with  other partners.  Up 
to  1969, the rise of 180 per cent registered in  American ex-
ports to  the  Community contrasted with  an  advance  of 140 
per cent in trade with  the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)  countries and 120 per cent with the rest of the world. 
EC,  A Political  Force  in  Africa 
American objections to Community policy have concentrated 
on two  facets.  First,  the  Community's policy  towards  Medi-
terranean  and  African  countries.  The United States  has  re-
peatedly  expressed  a  fear  that  the  membership  negotiations 
would  lead  to  the  formation  of  a  gigantic  preference  bloc 
from which non-member industrialized nations and non-asso-
ciated developing countries would be shut out. Apart from the 
fact that this point is  still  being discussed  in the membership 
negotiations,  this  criticism  of  the  Community's  preference 
policy has no discernible economic justification. Furthermore, 
it  reveals  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Community's  motives 
and activities. 
In  Africa,  the  Community  has  taken  over  an  important 
responsibility on  behalf of the  member states.  The Commu-
nity's  aim  is  not  a  closed  trading  bloc,  but  a  development 
policy which allows for the special  historical  relationships of 
the member states. The Community is  seeking to help ensure 
long-term  stability in  the  Mediterranean countries,  and thus 
contributing,  by  effective  long-term  means,  to  peaceful  ad-
vance  at  one of the explosive  points  of the present  interna-
tional  political scene. 
U.S.  Farm  Exports  Recovered  in  1970 
The second recurring theme is  the  implications of the Com-
munity's common agricultural policy for the foreign trade of 
other  countries.  The  common  agricultural  policy  is  one  of 
several possible attempts to resolve  the socio-economic prob-
Adapted  from  Commissioner  Dahrendorf's  address  to  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament in  Luxembourf? on January  19,  1971. 
!em  of  agriculture  in  industrial  states.  The  fact  that  the 
United States has selected another system should not prevent 
it  from  considering  the  Community's  policy  through  Com-
munity eyes, just as the Community is  prepared to assess U.S. 
action in  the light of American political  motives.  To a  con-
siderable extent, the common agricultural  policy is  a success-
ful  attempt to resolve the problem. It has entailed an increase 
in  production which,  although it certainly affects  trade, does 
so  in  a completely normal and legitimate way.  Gradually, an 
agricultural  system  is  settling into  a  durable form.  The fact 
that it is  not doing so  in  an  atmosphere of free  world trade 
merely reflects the features of agricultural policy in all  coun-
tries of the world. The United States should be able to appre-
ciate how open the Community is  in  the  agricultural  sphere, 
as in others. The total value of American farm exports to the 
Community dropped slightly  for some years.  But in  the first 
ten months of 1970 it had passed the  $1.2  billion  registered 
for the whole of 1969. This was  an increase of 23.4 per cent 
over the figure  for the first  ten  months of 1969,  a period in 
which  U.S.  agricultural  exports  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
showed  an  advance  of 21.5  per cent. 
World  Powers  Must  Shoulder Their  Problems 
There  is  an  agricultural  problem  in  the  United States,  also. 
The U.S.  textile  industry provides  fewer  jobs despite  its  pro-
ductivity  gains.  In  some  fields,  competition  with  low-price 
countries  is  hampered  in  the  United  States,  as  in  the  Com-
munity,  by  high  production  costs.  There  are  questions  of 
differing  taxation  of  American  companies  within  and  out-
side  their own tax area. These problems need to be  resolved. 
But  is  it  an  answer to  take  protective  measures  which  utili-
mately  damage  everybody's  interests,  including  one's  own? 
A world power has little to  gain,  economically or politically, 
by attempting to shift its internal problems on to the shoulders 
of others.  Nobody  abroad  is  responsible  for  America's  eco-
nomic  troubles,  and  the  attempt  to  punish  others,  including 
the  Community,  for  these  difficulties  will  boomerang. 
This does  not mean  that there  are no problems which  we 
must solve  together.  An occasional clash  between the world's 
two biggest trading partners is  not surprising. There are points 
where our interests or opinions diverge. But the proper answer 
is  a joint endeavor to  find  a solution, not a  silent battle.  The 
Community's  defense  of its  interests  never violates  the  prin-
ciples  of  free  international  trade  contained  in  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  which  it  supports 
out of conviction,  not just necessity. 
Japan's  Part  in  U.S.  Anxieties 
Until  recently,  however,  the  Community  has  been  a  minor 
source of American anxieties. The development in the United 
States of restrictive  trade attitudes  began  mainly with  Japan. 
This  is  understandable,  in  view  of  the  volume  of  mutual 
trade.  Visible  trade  be ween  Japan  and  the  United  States  is 
running  at  a  total  of  $8.3  billion;  trade  between  the  two 
countries accounts  for  11  per cent of American,  and  27  per 
cent of Japanese, sales  abroad. 
Trade between the Community and Japan has not reached 
a level  leading to  similar mutual  dependence. Two-way trade 
is  worth  $1.3  billion,  and  represents  only  2  per cent of the 
Community's and 5 per cent of Japan's external trade.  There Responding to consumer demand for inexpensive transportation,  American car manufacturers met the "foreign import threat" by developing 
competitive sub-compact models. The Fiat plant at Turin, Italy. PHOTO:  Courtesy Italian Cultural Institute,  New  York. 
are  grounds  for  supposing  that  the  proportion  of exports  to 
total  Japanese  output  will  increase.  Japan  has  thus  reached 
the  take-off point of a  new  course  in  which  it  is  more open 
to the rest of the world than previously. 
It was therefore natural that immediately after its common 
trade policy came into effect in  January 1970, the Community 
should have sought to put its relations with Japan on a formal 
basis.  On  November  10,  1969,  the  Council  authorized  the 
Commission  to  hold  exploratory  talks  with  the  Japanese 
Government about a trade agreement. These talks  took place 
in  February 1970 and led to the negotiating mandate of July 
20,  1970. Last September it seemed  advisable  to  hold further 
political talks in Japan. My visit to Tokyo in  November 1970 
helped clarify bilateral questions and consolidate the contacts 
already  established. The Community hopes  that  the  negotia-
tions will  be successfully concluded this year. 
Opposition  to  Japanese  economic  expansion  is  partly  due 
to  its  volume and partly to the style  of the expansion, partic-
ularly  of Japanese  exports.  According  to  some,  the  way  in 
which Japanese exporters, or their Community representatives, 
seek  to  secure new markets  bears  the  hallmark of a  ruthless 
policy of conquest. So  there  are more frequent calls  for pro-
tective measures against Japan than against others. In addition, 
Japan itself still  applies  many  restrictions,  especially  on  for-
eign  investments,  so  it  is  understandable  that  there  is  no 
great readiness in  the member states  to  give  up existing safe-
guards without any quid pro quo. 
Meanwhile,  Japan-partly  in  view  of  such  feelings  as 
these-is on  the  threshold  of full  participation  in  the  inter-
national  trade  system.  The  harsh  and  sometimes  emotional 
criticism  of  Japanese  economic  behavior  should  be  invalid 
in  a  few  years'  time.  Japanese  leaders  themselves  reiterate 
their  desire  to  establish good  conduct  in  world trade. 
Mutual Trade  Ties 
Relations between the Community and Japan are still  in  their 
initial  stage.  Japan  is  cautiously  proceeding  towards  closer 
international  involvement;  she  sees  the  Community  as  a 
welcome partner-because it does not compromise her politi-
cally.  The  Community  seeks,  through  the  settlement  of  its 
relations  with  Japan,  a  durable  solution  to  the  economic 
stresses which occasionally emerge. 
The mutual trade links between the Community, the United 
States,  and Japan mean  that a  chain reaction  is  inevitable  if 
one of the three succumbs to protectionist tendencies.  In that 
case  the  Community  would  be  the  hardest  hit.  The  Com-
munity  depends  on  free,  intensive  world  trade.  This  is  still 
not so  true of Japan, while  the United States' dependence on 
world  trade  has  been  limited.  This  is  the  Community's 
strength  and  weakness.  Protectionism  by  others  would 
threaten  its  exports,  even  if  it  took  the  form  of a  bilateral 
"voluntary restraints" agreement on exports between Japan and 
the United States. 
But Community  exports  would  also  be  jeopardized  by  its 
own  protectionism,  even  if  this  were  only  a  temporary  re-
taliation to measures by others. The Community is a champion 
of free world trade out of conviction and interest. The entire 
structure of the  Community  is  geared  to  liberal  world  trade. 
The deepening  and  enlarging  of the  Community will  further 
strengthen  this  structure.  What  the  Community  wants  is  a 
trade  offensive  of  a  completely  different  nature-an  inter-
penetration of the economies of the major developed countries 
by  trade  and  investments  so  that  the  Community's  interests 
of today will be those of all. If this is  achieved and if, perhaps, 
the  state-trading  countries  of the  Eastern  bloc  are  brought 
into  such  a  system,  then  not  just  trade  wars  will  become 
impossible. 
Realistic  Free  Trade  Drive  Needed 
Defensive measures are  no  help. What we  need is  a new free 
trade drive. Not in  a  dramatic sense.  A fresh  comprehensive 
"round"  (of  negotiations)  would  probably  not  accomplish 
much at the  moment.  A realistic drive  towards liberalization 
would entail all  major world-trade  partners  re-examining the 
possibility of making new  contributions to  opening up world 
trade by  complete implementation of the  Kennedy Round; a 
review of non-tariff trade barriers; and joint settlement of devel-
opment policy issues, including some separation of development 
and trade policies. 
The  Community has  always  been willing  to  reappraise  its 
policies on these  lines.  It feels  a special  duty to do so  at the 
time  of the  enlargement negotiations. The major trading and 
economic unit formed in  Europe by enlargement of the Com-
munity will be open to the world. The tradition of the would-be 
members is in itself a guarantee of this. The Community's part-
ners should carry out a similar reappraisal.  7 8 
U.S. Trade  Legislation : 
STEPHEN  D.  COHEN 
Fifteen months after President Nixon  submitted  the  first  ma-
jor U.S.  trade  bill  in  eight  years,  the  Ninety-first  Congress 
adjourned, having generated considerable debate and effort but 
no trade legislation. The transition of the President's non-con-
troversial Trade Act of 1969 to the highly controversial Trade 
Act of 1970 left  in  its  wake  polemics,  confusion,  and threats 
of retaliation  by many major trading partners  of the  United 
States. Many observers would like to forget that the great trade 
imbroglio  of  1970  ever happened.  It produced  a  disquieting 
sense of drift about future U.S.  trade policy.  Yet it  also  pro-
vided  important  lessons  in  the  dynamics  of  U.S.  decision-
making in  the field  of international trade. 
A "Modest" Beginning 
On November  18,  1969,  President Nixon  submitted to  Con-
gress  his  proposed  "Trade  Act  of 1969"-which he  himself 
described as  "modest in scope." The Administration's bill  con-
tained four main provisions: limited tariff cutting authority for 
the President; elimination of the American-selling-price  (ASP) 
system  of customs  valuation  in  fulfillment  of an  earlier Ken-
nedy Round agreement; a modest liberalization of the criteria 
under which the  Tariff Commission  could  invoke  the  escape 
clause  or extend  adjustment  assistance  in  cases  where  U.S. 
companies or workers could prove injury from  import compe-
tition;  and  finally,  an  extension  of Section  252 of the  Trade 
Expansion  Act of 1962 to  give  the  President  retaliatory  au-
thority  in  cases  of  foreign  discrimination  against  any  U.S. 
export, not just agricultural goods. 
Buried  in  the  President's  message  was  a  passing  reference 
that  the  textile  import  problem  was  "a special  circumstance 
that requires special measures." This position, so casually and 
briefly mentioned, was to be the greatest single factor in chang-
ing the  entire complexion  of the  trade  bill  and  in  producing 
the  near  abandonment  of  the  35-year  commitment  by  the 
United States  to  free  international trade. 
Commitment to  Protect  Textiles 
While  a Presidential candidate, Mr.  Nixon  had  made a com-
mitment to  the U.S.  textile  industry to extend to woolens  and 
man-made  textiles  quantitative  import  limitations  similar  to 
the bilateral quotas contained in  the 1961  Long-term Interna-
tional Cotton Textile Agreement  (LTA) . Man-made textile im-
ports  into  the  United  States  have  grown  steeply  from  their 
low  base in  the previous years of this comparatively new  and 
increasingly popular product. 
The  task  of securing  voluntary  agreements  by  the  major 
textile-exporting countries  of Europe and Asia  to  restrict the 
future growth of their textile exports to  the United States fell 
to Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans. In a sense, the success 
of his task depended on recreating the international economic 
atmosphere of 1961, which allowed agreement on the LTA,  at 
a time when  American economic hegemony was  being ques-
tioned by even the friendliest of this country's allies. 
Reflecting, in part, the fact that total imports of man-made 
fiber products by value accounted for only slightly above 4 per 
cent  of total  U.S.  consumption,  the  Commerce  Secretary's 
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chief  argument for voluntary  restraints  centered  less  on the 
damage inflicted  on the domestic textile  industry by imports 
than on  the  likelihood  that  an  increasingly  restive  Congress 
would act spontaneously and confront the President with legis-
lated textile  quotas.  Voluntary restraints were  considered the 
lesser of two  evils.  "I think it would  be  undesirable  ever to 
solve the problem by unilateral actions," Mr. Stans declared in 
August 1969. Nevertheless, he made it clear that spiraling im-
ports of man-made textiles threatened to inflict  unacceptable 
damage on a large and important U.S. industry. 
In  an effort to provide the impetus for a quick, clean, vol-
untary arrangement, Rep.  Wilbur Mills  (D-Ark.), Chairman 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced in  May 
of 1969, a mandatory textile quota bill  (which could be super-
seded by voluntary agreements)  limiting all  textile imports to 
the average  annual  figure  in  the  1967-68  period.  In  a  sense, 
Mr.  Stans had  made a  self-fulfilling prophecy.  The Adminis-
tration's attempt to abide by  a political commitment was the 
catalyst for a Congressional  march into action. 
Growing  Disenchantment 
The members of the U.S.  Congress,  as  in  democratic parlia-
ments  throughout  the  world,  are  sensitive  to  their constitu-
ents' problems and demands, including protection from import 
competition. Nevertheless, the strong commitment of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to trade liberalization for the past 35 years has 
held  in  abeyance  the  latent  protectionist  sentiment  in  the 
legislative branch. 
The  Administration's  argument  that  the  size  and  impor-
tance  of  the  textile  industry  presented  a  "special"  situation 
might have left undisturbed the sleeping giant of protectionism 
in Congress had the Administration's trade proposals not been 
taken up by  the  House Ways  and  Means  Committee.  What 
originally had been  conceived  by the Executive Branch  as  a 
modest  holding  action  in  the  area  of  trade  liberalization 
turned into the right legislative vehicle, in  the right place,  at 
the right time for institutionalizing Congress's growing disen-
chantment with liberal trade. 
Many members of Congress had come to believe that there 
were good reasons to question the liberal trade policy that the 
successful  Kennedy  Round  of tariff  cutting talks  had seem-
ingly proven valid. Suddenly, in many offices on Capitol Hill, 
liberal  trade  went out of vogue.  The post-Vietnam  inflation 
had all but eliminated the traditional American trade surplus, 
the mercantilist proof of a successful economic policy. 
Many former liberal trade advocates suddenly and unilater-
ally  declared  the United States  to be  the  world's  most open 
market at a time when its major trading partners were thriving 
on protectionist policies which openly discriminated against a 
wide range of U.S. products. 
Farm  and  Labor  Support  Withdrawn 
Besides  the damage  done  by the emaciated  trade balance,  a 
major part of the  traditional  liberal  trade  constituency-the 
AFL-CIO  and the  agricultural bloc-had withdrawn their sup-
port.  The AFL-CIO's  disenchantment  was  based  primarily on 
its  belief that the traditional approaches to international trade 
had been made obsolete by  the  proliferation of  multinational 
corporations.  the  internationalization  of technology,  and  the Retrospect and  Prospects 
increase  of "managed economies"  abroad.  A  second,  albeit 
more temporary defection stemmed from a lessening of inter-
est in liberal trade on the part of the U.S.  farm bloc. This re-
flected its preoccupation in  1970 with major revisions in farm 
legislation,  its  disenchantment  over  the  European  Commu-
nity's common agricultural policy, and its disappointment with 
the extent of reductions of foreign  agricultural barriers in the 
Kennedy Round. 
In the early summer of 1970,  all  the elements of a  major 
drama  were  falling  into  place.  On  May  11,  the  Ways  and 
Means Committee began hearings on the President's trade pro-
posals submitted almost six  months previously. For six weeks, 
the Committee heard testimony from  some  400 witnesses.  A 
dramatic  climax  occurred  when  Commerce  Secretary  Stans 
made  a  return  appearance before  the  Committee  on  its  last 
day of public hearings.  He said  that a solution  to the textile 
import problem was still needed, but apparently would not be 
forthcoming  in  the  form  of a voluntary agreement.  Then he 
said that, "In the absence of agreements with Japan and with 
other key  exporting  countries,  it  is  our  reluctant  judgment 
that the only means presently available for solving this prob-
lem is  the textile legislation now before this Committee." The 
legislation he referred to was the bill  introduced by Mr. Mills 
one year earlier. 
The  Ghosts  of Protectionism 
Nothing could better describe  the consequence of this  reluc-
tant  embrace than  the  old  cliche  that  a  Pandora's box had 
been  opened.  The  ghosts  of  protectionism  now  were  un-
leashed. That they had done their work was  demonstrated in 
mid-July, when the Ways and Means Committee reported out 
HR  18970  "The Trade Act of 1970." It was  the  most pro-
tectionist ;ieee of trade  legislation  in  almost  40 years.  The 
Administration  watched  helplessly  as  the  Ways  and  Means 
Committee blithely  ignored  its  plea to  make just one excep-
tion  to  the  tenet  that quotas  were  not  in  the  U.S.  national 
interest. The Administration had unleashed pressures which it 
could not control. 
The Committee's bill  had added to  the President's original 
proposals,  among  other  things,  quotas  on  most  textile  and 
footwear articles,  tariff quotas on mink  and glycine,  and the 
so-called  "Byrnes-Basket"  (for its  author,  Wisconsin  Repre-
sentative John Byrnes, senior Republican on the Committee). 
The latter provided potential relief to small businesses lacking 
"political  clout"  in  the  form  of an  arbitrary  arithmetic  for-
mula. Having liberalized the language of the escape clause far 
beyond that asked for by the President, this portion of the bill 
empowered  the  Tariff  Commission  to  recommend  escape 
clause  action  by the  President  in  cases  where  increased im-
ports  contributed  "substantially''  (whether  or  not  such  in-
creased imports were the major factor or the primary factor) 
toward causing or threatening to  cause  injury to a  domestic 
industry.  Such a recommendation to  the President would be-
come binding,  however,  if any of the  following  "triggering" 
criteria were met: 
•  Whether imports constitute more than 15 per cent of appar-
ent United States consumption in the calendar year the investi-
gation was instituted and whether the ratio of imports to con-
sumption for such calendar year increased at least 3 per cent 
over  that  ratio  for  the  second  calendar  year  preceding  the 
year in which the investigation was instituted and whether the 
ratio increased 5 per cent over the ratio for the third calendar 
year prior to the investigation; or 
•  Whether as  the result of increased  imports,  domestic pro-
duction  of like  or directly  competitive  products  is  declining 
or likely to decline so as  to substantially affect the productive 
ability of the  domestic producers,  and  jobs or hours worked 
or wages  are  declining substantially  or are  likely  to  decline 
substantially; and 
•  Whether the imported articles are offered for sale  at  prices 
substantially  below  those  of like  or directly  competitive  do-
mestic products and the unit labor costs to make the imported 
article are substantially below the unit labor costs of produc-
ing like or directly competitive articles in the United States. 
American industries and workers who felt  adversely affect-
ed by imports hailed the bill  as  a long overdue policy reorien-
tation to  a changing international trade situation.  Their only 
complaint was that the bill  did not go far enough and allowed 
the President too  much flexibility. Secretary Stans,  the most 
vocal  proponent of the bill,  called  it  "a remarkable  piece  of 
work." He claimed that it granted the President sufficient flexi-
bility to act in  the national interest, and he dismissed as  "a lot 
of nonsense"  the  argument that the bill  would  bring on for-
eign retaliation and a trade war. Instead, he saw the bill  as  an 
inducement to other countries to  reach voluntary agreements 
restraining textile and footwear exports, a move which would 
cause an ebbing of trade problems. 
Other official  and  private  statements  were  sharply  critical 
and  often  warned  of  impending  disaster  should  the  bill  be 
signed into law. More than 4,000 economists signed an appeal 
asking  the  Congress  to  reject  all  direct  and  indirect  import 
controls  and  urging  President  Nixon  to  veto  any  such  that 
the Congress might pass. In  the appeal, the economists assert-
ed that "import controls would  be an  unproductive and irre-
sponsible answer to the problems and needs of industries and 
workers seeking Government help against foreign competition. 
There are serious adjustment problems at home and consider-
able cause for irritation at the treatment accorded our exports 
abroad, but the right answer does not lie in triggering a trade 
war. That would only made a bad situation worse." 
The National Chamber of Commerce warned that the con-
sequences  of  U.S.  adoption  of  artificial  restraints  on  trade 
would include accelerated inflation, foreign retaliation, stagna-
tion  in  U.S.  industrial  competitiveness,  and  a  "progressive 
cartelization of the U.S.  market, inducing stultifying controls 
which  would  distort the nation's economy and  debilitate  the 
free enterprise system." 
In the Ways and Means Committee's Report to the House 
of Representatives  on  HR  18970,  the  dissenting  Committee 
minority called the  bill  "restrictive,  ill-timed,  and provincial. 
It will  provide  artificial  market controls and  increase  prices. 
It is  inflationary. It decidedly reflects  a lack of confidence in 
the basic worth of our own competitive system. It would be  a 
backward step for America and for the world." 
The  President's  adviser  on  Consumer  Affairs,  Virginia 
Knauer,  labeled  the  trade  bill  as  being  in  many  ways  "the 
most  significant  anti-consumer legislation  now  in  Congress."  9 She urged Congress to  place the  welfare of the nation's con-
sumers "before the welfare of a few  individual industries." 
Columnists Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond suggested that 
the term "trade bill" was a misnomer, because it was an "anti-
trade bill."  The New York Times editorialized that "it would 
be  difficult to conceive of legislation worse suited to the inter-
ests  of the  nation." A  Wall Street Journal editorial  said  that 
"any protectionists  who  think  the  trade  picture  can  be  im-
proved by curbing imports are kidding themselves ... . [Con-
sumers]  will  be  compelled  to  subsidize  a  lot of businessmen 
[who] will have less incentive to curb their own costs and seek 
other ways to become more competitive." 
With  the  latent  protectionism  of Congress  threatening  to 
become blatant, the  views  of the President assumed  vital  im-
portance.  In  his  press  conference of July  20,  1970,  he said 
that he  would  "certainly"  veto  a  trade  bill  which  contained 
restrictive provisions which he had not recommended. Speak-
ing  generally,  he  continued,  "mandatory quota  legislation  is 
not in  the  interest of the United States.  We  are  an  exporting 
nation rather than an  importing nation." While quota legisla-
tion would save some jobs in  the short run,  in  the long run it 
would cost the  United States  more  jobs  in  export industries, 
he said.  "Even more important," he added, "it is  highly infla-
tionary, as anybody who has studied tariffs and quotas through 
the years is well aware." 
Textiles were excluded from  the  norm. The President said 
that,  because  of the  importance  of  the  textile  industry,  he 
needed fall-back authority to impose mandatory textile quotas 
in  the  event  that  negotiations  on  voluntary  export  restraints 
with Japan and other countries failed.  Undaunted, the House 
of Representatives passed  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee's 
trade bill  without change on  November  19,  by  a surprisingly 
close 215 to 165 vote. 
Had  the  normal  legislative  timetable  been  followed,  the 
Senate Finance Committee would have opened hearings  fol-
lowing  House  passage.  However,  time was  running out.  The 
91st Congress was  hoping to go  home before Christmas and 
was required by the Constitution to adjourn no later than the 
third of January. If the 91st Congress did not send  the Presi-
dent a trade bill  before adjourning, the 92nd Congress would 
have  to  begin  the legislative  process  all  over  again  in  1971. 
Therefore, to expedite the legislative process, in October, well 
before  the  House  had  passed  the  bill,  the  Senate  Finance 
Committee Chairman  Russell  Long  (D-La.)  decided  to hold 
hearings, with less  than 48 hours' warning, to  consider a fun-
damental shift in  U.S.  trade policy. 
These hearings, on October 9 and  12, were highlighted not 
only by their brevity but also  by the  public disagreement be-
tween  two  members  of  Mr.  Nixon's  Cabinet.  Secretary  of 
State  William  Rogers  said  that  the  protectionist  features  of 
the trade bill "would cause serious harm to the United States" 
and could lead to restrictions on as much as  $3  billion of U.S. 
imports. Considering the potential impact on other countries, 
Rogers warned that "other governments would not be  able to 
accept  passively  increased  trade  restrictions  by  the  United 
States." Secretary Stans, on the other hand, told the Commit-
tee  that he  doubted whether anything in  the bill  would result 
in  lost U.S.  exports.  He argued that the United States  could 
no longer afford its old "soft" trade policy. "We can no longer 
be the country of great wealth that can hold an  umbrella over 
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The Senate Finance Committee on November 30 approved 
by a comfortable margin, as  an amendment to pending Social 
Security legislation, the essence of the protectionist portions of 
the bill  approved by the House of Representatives. The major 
difference between the two bills was the Finance Committee's 
deletion of two provisions supported by the liberal trade com-
munity: ASP repeal and creation of the Domestic International 
Sales Corporation (Disc)  to encourage U.S. export growth by 
giving qualifying U.S. exporters long-term tax deferrals. Many 
observers felt that these changes represented a further regres-
sion from a liberal trade policy. 
21  Senators  Protest 
Senate  opposition  to  the legislation  was  best  expressed  in  a 
statement signed by 21  Senators on November 24: 
"The great expansion  of world  trade  in the  past  decade, 
brought on by our own  Trade Expansion  Act  of  1962,  has 
been of enormous  benefit  to  the  American  worker,  farmer, 
businessman,  and consumer.  While there is  an unquestioned 
need for new trade legislation to assist workers and industries 
which are becoming less competitive on the world market; to 
hasten the elimination of trade barriers, particularly in Europe 
and Japan; and to set the tone for world trade policies in the 
1970's, it is  becoming increasingly clear that such legislation 
is  not possible  given  the  limitations of the  post-election  ses-
sion of the Congress. 
"It is our sincere belief that a trade bill  would cause grave 
harm to the  farmer;  would  jeopardize employment in  many 
of our most  important and  significant  industries;  would  im-
pose higher prices on the American consumer, and would do 
irreparable harm to our foreign  policy  and  to the future  of 
trade negotiations with our major trading partners." 
President Nixon, sensing that the situation was  getting out 
of hand,  wrote  to Senate  Republican leader Hugh Scott on 
December 10, "vigorously" reaffirming his o'riginal trade pro-
posals,  as  well  as  his support for textile  quotas and  the  DISC 
provision. The letter criticized the addition of shoe  quotas to 
the  bill  and  warned  of  the  possibility  of  additional  import 
quotas  on  numerous  other  products  "because  the  escape 
clause in the present law has been loosened excessively." The 
President  wrote  that  "these  changes  could  have  not  only 
harmful short-term consequences within our country, but also, 
in the long term, they could trigger international trade prac-
tices  destructive  of the  economy of the  entire  free  world." 
However, at no time did the President repeat his intention to 
veto  such  a  far-ranging  bill  if passed  by  Congress  over  his 
objections. 
Time Runs  Out 
No protectionist trade legislation was enacted by the Congress 
in  1970 for the simple  reason  that time  ran  out.  The Con-
gress had had no second thoughts about the wisdom of legis-
lating textile  and footwear  quotas  and  virtually opening the 
door to utilization of the escape clause.  Rather, in the closing 
days of the special post-Christmas session, the Senate became 
bogged down in  lengthy debates on such topics  as  trade, the 
supersonic transport,  and military aid  to Cambodia.  As part 
of a major effort to clear the legislative logjam, a last minute 
compromise allowed a  vote on the highly  popular bill  to in-
crease Social Security benefits without the controversial trade 
amendment. Trade legislation in this session of Congress was 
dead. 
It was a classic case of being saved by the bell. 
But, as  Mr. Nixon said in  his end-of-year letter to Senator 
Scott, the well-being of the United States requires new trade 
legislation. The President currently has no authority to lower 
U.S.  tariffs,  not even  in  cases where the United States wants 
to offer compensation to other countries injured by unilateral 
withdrawal of past tariff concessions. Clearly, the momentum 
of international trade will  at best be in  limbo until additional 
trade legislation  allows  the  Executive  Branch  to  press  for-
ward in  international forums  with  the  unfinished  business  of 
eliminating  artificial  barriers  to  a  flow  of trade  directed  by 
open market forces. 
The  Lesson  of 1970 
The lesson of 1970 is  that progressive legislation will  not be 
forthcoming unless  the President's trade proposals are disen-
tangled from the textile issue.  Unless the new Congress has a 
vastly  different  organization  and temperament from  the  last 
Congress, the President is  unlikely to be able to sell  his  con-
cept  of  liberal-trade-with-just-one-exception.  At  the  same 
time, it would be a misconception to portray the President as 
the prisoner of a Congress with a runaway protectionist senti-
ment. Reference to the Trade Act of 1970 as  the "Mills Bill" 
is  a misnomer. While dutifully supporting on the House floor 
the result of his Committee's deliberations, Mr. Mills strongly 
favored  breaking  the  textile  impasse  by  using  a  reasonable 
compromise as  the basis for voluntary textile restraints. 
What are the likely alternatives? The textile issue could be 
solved  by  an  amicable  voluntary  agreement with Japan  and 
other countries, or the  President might  achieve  his  goal  of 
providing  protection  for  the  textile  industry  through  use  of 
existing legislation, such as the escape clause or Article XII of 
the GATT. Or, he might abandon the struggle, having decided 
that  he  had  already  expended  sufficient  effort  to  have  re-
deemed his campaign promise. Within the Congress, a textile 
bill could be passed by itself, or in the form of an amendment 
to a wholly separate tax or welfare bill in the same manner as 
the Finance Committee tried to expedite last minute passage 
of the Trade Act of 1970. 
If any  of these  options  materialize,  there  is  an  excellent 
possibility  that  the  protectionist  pressures  in  Congress  will 
return  to  their latent state.  The cries  that the  United States 
"is  going  protectionist"  may well  turn  out to  be  premature. 
Undoubtedly the  pressures  for  a  modification  of this  coun-
try's commitment to  liberal trade will  continue to be intense 
and widespread.  Although the constituency for liberal  trade 
in effect includes every American consumer, organized lobby-
ing pressures still favor the minority of industries and work-
ers who feel  adversely  affected  by imports. 
But  the  single  most critical  factor affecting  the  course of 
U.S.  trade  policy  will  be  Presidential  leadership.  Only  Mr. 
Nixon  can  snap  shut  the  Pandora's  box.  If he  chooses  to 
divorce  the textile  problem from  the  normal course  of pro-
gressive trade legislation, the unhappy events of 1970 will not 
be repeated.  11 12 
The CAP's Last Chance 
THE  MEMB'ER  GOVERNMENTS  of the  European Communities 
have been given one last chanoe to save their common agricul-
tural pol:icy {CAP ) . They must now decide between the gradual 
relUI.'tiona!l:ization of agriculture or closer integration through a 
oommon commitment to changing the structure of farming. 
At its February 15-16 meeting in Brussels, the Council of 
Mirmisters had an initial exchange of views on a new proposal 
from the Commission, bluntly stating the case: any country that 
wants price increases, however slight, must also support reform 
m  !the basic structure of farming. 
farmers' Discontent Mounting 
Recent farmers' demonstrations, seeking price increases, reflect 
the  Community's basic farm problem:  too many people  are 
worlcin:g <10o many small fanns and earning too little money for 
their effo.rts. The longer reform is  put off, the more farms, of 
every size, are running into trouble. 
Unrest in poor farming communities is  rising. Farm prices 
:ha;ve  remained fairly  stahle for more than three years while 
prices of manufactured  goods  have  risen  steadily,  reducing 
wealthy farmers' profits available for reinvestment and cutting 
into mcmey poor farmers need to feed, shelter, and clothe their 
families. Since the Community has done nothing to solve these 
prll)b]ell'lli., the member states have begun to take measures to 
help  out the poorest of their farmers,  thus  jeopardizing the 
wmikable parts of the .common agricultural policy. 
Two-l'ear De.lay Damaging 
Two years  ago,  in  December  1968,  a  ten-year  program to 
rectify  this  situation  was  put fOiward  in  the  Commission's 
memorandum on .agricultural reform, dubbed ''The Mansholt 
Plan" for .its main architect, Commission Vice President Sicco 
L. Mansholt. The first legislative  proposa~s to carry out struc-
tural reform, submitted in April1970, are still before the Coun-
cil. (See Eunopean Community No. 135, ;page~ 7 and 8.) These 
proposals offer incentives to farm modernization .and consoli-
dation; to switching out of tbe production of milk, a surplus 
commodity,  into meat production;  to encourage  farmers  to 
leave the land, by offering old-age pensions to those over 55 
years of age;  to offer  temporary non-planning incentives; to 
teach  those  who remain on the  land modern  farming  tech-
niques, and to en.courage d'le formation of producei'S' cooper-
atives. 
Effort to Break Sta1emate 
ln an .effort to break the 'Stalemate. Mr. MansliDlt invited the 
six member governments' ministers of agricu1ture to .an off-the-
record meeting in the Val Ducbesse Chateau outside of Brus-
sels,  on December 1,  1970.  From this inifonna!J  exchange of 
views, the member gover,mments' priorities within the farm re-
form package emerged. Before approving the new proposals, 
.embodied  in  the  new  price-increase-with-structural-reform 
draft resolution now h>efore the Council, tile Commission was 
able to consider the views expressed informally by the member 
,governments, thrn; improving t'he  chances ·of passage. 
Structur.al R-efmm and .Prices 
The proposals made last April remain basicalJly unchanged, but 
with  their  passage,  small  increases  in farm  prices  will  be 
allowed. For the  1971/72 grain season  beginning on August 1,  the 
Commission has proposed a 2 per cent increase in the price of 
soft wheat and a 5 per cent increase in the price of barley. Sup-
plements would also be raised for the costs of stocking. These 
measures  would  lower the price gap between soft wheat  and 
barley by 3 per cent and encourage their use as animal feeds. 
Poor pastures this past season  have  increased the  costs  of 
dairy farming. As a result, the Commission felt forced to allow 
a 5 per cent increase in the cost of milk. 
To encourage beef  production,  the  Commission  proposed 
a price increase of 5 per cent this year and 5 per cent next. This 
increase, together with the slaughter premium offered on small 
dairy herds, should give dairy farmers an incentive to replace 
milk cows  with beef cattle.  Special  premiums are  also  being 
paid for mating milk cows  to pure-bred beef cattle,  such as 
Charolais. 
For sugarbeets, the Commission is recommending slight price 
reductions. In view of the high sugar yield and the Community's 
international sugar commitments, the Commission thinks that 
only a price reduction can help to maintain the status quo. 
Basic Reform Innovations 
In addition to the measures proposed last April, the Commis-
sion  now suggests  that farmers  between  the  ages  of 45  and 
55 who have no alternative but to  remain on the land should 
receive an income supplement of $400 a year. If  these farmers 
accept this supplement, they must promise to make their land 
available to the farm reform program upon reaching the age of 
55 and to accept an annual pension of $1 ,000. Younger farmers 
would receive vocational training and allowances during their 
training to allow them to switch to another occupation. 
Agricultural investments give a relatively low rate of return 
in comparison with industrial  investments, yet  the larger the 
farm, the more heavily must the farmer invest. For this reason, 
the Commission would like to grant rebates of up to 6 per cent 
of the interest payments on  investments to finance producers' 
cooperatives and to modernize large farms. The farmer or co-
operative would pay 2 per cent of the interest charges. The main 
criterion for granting an interest rebate would be a farm's de-
velopment capacity as  indicated by its  profit per worker. The 
Commission  thinks  each worker should  produce  $10,000  to 
$12,000 in net profit, depending on farming conditions in each 
region. (The Parliament disagrees. See page 20.) 
Aid According to Need 
The Community's farm fund would pay up to half the costs of 
financing agricultural reform measures; the individual member 
countries, the remainder. However, since the  poorest agricul-
tural  regions  are  the  least  able  to  finance  farm  reform,  the 
Commission  plans to ask the  Council  to  vary the  amount of 
the farm fund's contribution according to need. In those areas, 
the farm fund could pay up to 75 per cent. Initially, this policy 
would favor development in southern Italy and in the west and 
southwest parts of France, but in  the long-run, their growth 
will benefit the entire Community. 
If  the Council accepts these proposals which were slated for 
discussion at its  March 8-9  meeting, the common agricultural 
policy will again become a flexible economic and social instru-
ment. If  the decision is negative, it will die a slow death.  13 14 
Negotiations: Cause for Optimism 
The political will motivating both the Six and the British  jus-
tifies reasoned and reasonable optimism about the outcome of 
the negotiations for British membership in the European Com-
munities.  Agreement has  been  reached  on  a  wide  range  of 
issues, summarized below. If the rapid rate of advance achieved 
in the opening weeks of the negotiations has slowed down, it is 
because  the  negotiators  have  reached  the  hard  core  of the 
problems. 
SINCE  THE  INITIAL  MINISTERIAL  MEETING  in  Luxembourg on 
June 30, 1970, negotiations have been conducted at four levels: 
•  Experts from the member governments, the applicant coun-
tries' governments and the Commission have been working con-
stantly to pare problems down to their essentials and to lay the 
basis for political agreements. 
•  Independently of its right to initiate measures, the Commis-
sion has agreed to study and analyze data supplied by the British 
Government. 
•  The six member states' Permanent Representatives in Brus-
sels  and a British team led by  Con O'Neil  have been holding 
preparatory  negotiations  twice  a  month.  These  ministerial 
deputies  discuss  in  detail  all  the  points  that they  have  been 
asked to consider by the ministerial conference. 
•  About every six  weeks  the  ministers  themselves  meet.  To 
date,  four ministerial  meetings  have  been  held.  Another was 
scheduled for March 16. 
The joint negotiating position of the Community countries, 
as set out on June 30, 1970, provided for: 
•  the  applicant countries  accepting the  Community Treaties 
and subsequent legislation 
•  institution of a transition period for the removal of internal 
tariff barriers, the introduction of the common external customs 
tariff,  and  the  adoption of the  mechanism  and  prices  of the 
common agricultural  policy; problems in  these  matters to  be 
solved during the transition period 
•  enlargement and other appropriate changes in the composi-
tion  of  the  Community  institutions  (Commission,  Council, 
etc.) 
•  discussion of economic and monetary union, including the 
U.K.'s balance of payments, sterling balances, and the role of 
sterling as a reserve currency 
•  discussion of some problems concerning the European Coal 
and  Steel  Community  (Ecsc)  and  the  European  Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom). 
•  Association of British dependent territories with the enlarged 
Community, the offer to independent Commonwealth countries 
in  Africa of association  under the Yaounde Convention or a 
similar agreement, generalized preferences for Asian members 
of the Commonwealth, the ending of Commonwealth prefer-
ence for developed Commonwealth countries (though the spe-
cial  problem of New Zealand  was  acknowledged),  and con-
sideration of whether West  Indian Commonwealth countries 
should be offered association or whether their problems could 
best be settled by agreements for specific products (e.g., sugar). 
Preliminary Agreements 
The  second  ministerial  session  marked  the  first  agreements 
reached between the Community and Britain. The points settled 
were: 
Annual Review of Agricultural Prices. The British agreed to the 
Community procedure for fixing prices. This procedure is fairly 
flexible, to meet B-ritish wishes. 
Community Regulations for Liquid Milk, Pork and Eggs. Fol-
lowing  an  exchange  of views  on  the  interpretation  of Com-
munity regulations, the British accepted the regulations. 
Dependent British Territories. The ministers  announced their 
agreement  in  principle-subject to  the special cases  of Hong 
Kong, Gibraltar, and New Hebrides-on an association of these 
territories with the enlarged Community, similar to Treaty pro-
visions associating the overseas dependent territories of the Six. 
Common Trade Policy. The ministers noted that there was no 
problem  in  U.K.  acceptance  of  the  common  external  trade 
policy.  Reciprocal  exchange  of  information  was  agreed  on. 
Britain undertook that, after becoming a member, any bilateral 
agreements it reached during the negotiations would be subject 
to Community rules. 
During the  third ministerial  conference on  December 7-8, 
1970, the Six and the British agreed on: 
European Investment  Bank.  The U.K.  would  contribute  the 
same amount of capital as do Germany and France. 
Status  of  Certain  Independent  Developing  Commonwealth 
Countries.  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Nigeria,  Sierra 
Leone,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  and  Zambia  would  be  offered  a 
form of association with the enlarged Community. 
During the  fourth  ministerial conference held on February 
2, 1971, the Six and the British agreed on the trading system to 
be offered to certain Commonwealth countries: 
Developing  Nations  in  Asia.  The U.K.  imports  from  India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and Singapore would not be subject 
to the gradual application of customs duties under the common 
external tariff of the enlarged Community, if these imports came 
under the system of generalized preferences. The enlarged Com-
munity would,  if  necessary,  examine any problems connected 
with the application of generalized preferences being introduced 
by the industrial countries. It would also consider the interests 
of other nations in the same region. 
Hong Kong. The solution would be the same as for other Asian 
members of the Commonwealth (generalized preferences), ex-
cept for textiles and footwear, and special procedures for "sensi-
tive" products. This agreement would be subject to an examina-
tion of certain technical procedures, particularly the definition 
of origin. 
New Hebrides. Associated status would be envisaged for this 
territory, which is  administered jointly by France and Britain. 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These  countries would be 
offered  the  same  choice  (a  form  of association  with  the  en-
larged Community) as  the other developing African Common-
wealth  countries.  This  would  be  subject  to  a  solution  of the 
problem  of definition  of origin,  to  avoid  the  risk  of exports 
from  South Africa by-passing  the  Community's  common  ex-
ternal tariff;  these  three countries form a  customs union  with 
South Africa. 
Financing Gap 
Although  the fourth  ministerial  meeting ratified  a  number of 
agreements, particularly on certain Commonwealth countries, 
it also showed up the gap between the Six  and the British over 
the financing of Community expenses, particularly the U.K.'s. Compromise on the transition period, particularly the ques-
tion  of agricultural  financing,  does  not  appear  imminent.  At 
this stage, it is the major issue of the negotiations. 
The United  Kingdom and the  other three applicants  could 
not overnight become an integral part of the Community's cus-
toms union, where there is  unrestricted movement of manufac-
tured  and  agricultural  products  between  member states,  and 
which  has  outlined,  and  in  some  cases  (such  as  agriculture) 
carried out, common economic policies. A transition period is 
therefore necessary. 
The Six  gave themselves  a  twelve-year  transition period to 
reach this stage, from January 1,  1958, to December 31, 1969. 
The customs union was  achieved by July 1,  1968, 18  months 
before the date specified in the Common Market Treaty. 
In this field the first questions that arose between the Six and 
Britain were whether the transition period should be the same 
for agriculture and industry, and how long the transition period 
or periods should last. The Six favored a single period of the 
same duration for both sectors. The British, on the other hand, 
asked for a three-year transition period for their industry, and 
a six-year period for their agriculture. 
At the third ministerial conference on  December 7-8,  1970, 
the Six and the British agreed with the Commission's views on 
the subject, i.e. that there should be a period of equal duration 
-five years-by the end of which there would be unrestricted 
movement of both industrial and agricultural goods. 
However, more complex aspects  of the problem remained. 
At a Council session on October 27,  1970, the Six  had asked 
the Commission to submit an overall  report on the transition 
period. 
On November 17, 1970, the Commission sent a note to the 
Six,  recommending a  uniform transition period of five  years. 
This period would be long enough to enable the British to adapt 
smoothly,  and short enough  to  ensure  that  the  full  dynamic 
effect of membership could be felt,  and a homogeneous Com-
munity of Ten achieved as soon as  possible. By the end of the 
transition  period,  1978,  the  system  of the  Community's own 
budgetary  resources  would  be  fully  applied,  marking  an  im-
portant milestone in Community development. 
Agriculture 
The Commission suggested a mechanism involving: 
•  the introduction by the U.K. of market organization mech-
anisms when it became a member 
•  a  pre-planned five-year  program for  bringing prices  closer 
into line 
•  transitional measures for inter-Community trade (levies and 
refunds to offset price differences)  would gradually disappear 
as prices become comparable 
•  transitional  mechanisms  for trade  with  non-member coun-
tries (elimination of quotas, application of EC preferences, etc.) 
•  a shorter timetable could be envisaged for products for which 
Britain would abolish its deficiency-payments system. 
Customs Union 
Customs duties should gradually be eliminated between the Six 
and the Four, and a common customs tariff applied in stages to 
non-member countries by the member countries. The Commis-
sion suggested a reasonable parity between the agricultural and 
the industrial  sectors. It advocated  the  balanced abolition  of 
tariffs over five  years. A substantial reduction in tariffs should 
be made at the beginning  (25 per cent), followed  by  another 
reduction within the same year. 
The British tariff would  not be  aligned  immediately on the 
common external tariff. The Commission's viewpoint was based 
on the mechanisms of the Rome Treaty, which lays down that 
national tariffs should move towards the common external tariff 
when a certain level in  internal reductions has been achieved. 
The first step towards alignment would occur, at the latest, one 
year after membership. The system recommended would result 
in  a sufficiently progressive timetable and ensure parallel prog-
ress between internal reductions and alignment on the common 
external tariff. 
At the ministerial  conference on  February 2,  1971, it was 
envisaged that the progressive introduction of a customs union 
between the Six and the United Kingdom-on the assumption 
that the latter became a member on January 1,  1973-would 
consist of five  reciprocal  tariff  reductions of 20  per cent on 
April!, 1973; April!, 1974; January I, 1975; January 1, 1976; 
and July 1,  1977. 
The U.K.  would  introduce the  common external  tariffs  in 
four stages:  a 40 per cent reduction on January 1,  1974, and 
three  20  per cent reductions  on  January  1,  1975,  1976  and 
1977 respectively. 
Financing Community Policies 
In this way,  Britain would  at the same time contribute to the 
expenditure  and  benefit  from  the  revenue  of  the  enlarged 
Community. 
The  Commission's  objectives  here  are:  "progressivity," 
meaning that Britain's contribution to financing the Community 
and its  resources would ensure the general rate of progress of 
Britain's integration in the Community. As Britain would con-
tribute to  Community expenditure in  a normal way,  it would 
also help to finance the resources. Finally, and most important, 
as  rapid progress as  possible should be  made towards a homo-
geneous Community of Ten. 
In  view  of  these  preoccupations,  the  Commission  recom-
mended mechanisms and commitments regarding the financial 
aspects  of Britain's participation. The Commission envisaged 
two types of solution: 
The first, which would have the advantage of simplicity and 
clarity, would consist of Britain's "catching up" with the system 
of the Community's own budgetary resources (direct Common 
Market revenue) established by the Six on April22, 1970. 
If the present Community system were to be  applied to the 
U.K., the initial level would have to be sufficiently high to en-
able Britain to reach a normal level by the end of the transition 
period.  The  U.K.'s  initial  contribution  could  be  about  21.5 
per cent, between the levels of the German and French contri-
butions. The exact amount of Britain's final  contribution could 
not be stated. The Commission felt that this syste~ would make 
it possible to apply normal Treaty regulations without too great 
an impact. 
A second system envisaged by the Commission had the ad-
vantage  of  pitching  Britain's  contribution  at  a  lower  initial 
level,  between a floor and a ceiling.  This "two-pronged" for-
mula would also make it possible to apply normal Treaty regu- 15 16 
lations smoothly and progressively.  This "framework"  might 
place the British contribution at between 10 and 15 per cent in 
the first year of the transition period. (The latter system, known 
as the "progressive" system, appears to have more support.) 
The Commission em,Phasized that the first system would be 
viewed more favorably from the point of view of institutional 
life. In mid-December 1970, the British proposed an initial con-
tribution of about 3 per cent in the year following membership, 
rising to 15 per cent by the end of the transition period. 
During the meeting with British representatives on February 
2, 1971, the Six were unable to adopt a joint position (with fig-
ures)  in  response  to  the U.K.  views  expressed  in  December 
1970. The spokesman for the Six, however, voiced the following 
common principles: 
•  The Community noted with satisfaction that Britain accepted 
the present system of the Community's own resources and did 
not ask for adaptations or changes. 
•  Unimpeded progress toward full  application of the  system 
of Community resources should be  based  on the three com-
ponents of the system-farm-import levies, customs duties and 
a fraction of the common turnover tax  (TVA)  (or, instead,  a 
budgetary contribution based on gross national product). The 
method of applying this progressive system would be covered 
by a later Community proposal. 
Newsmen,  anxious to  hear  of progress in  the  membership  negoti-
ations,  crowded  around  French  Foreign  Minister  Maurice  Schu-
mann after the Council of Ministers adjourned on February 2. 
•  There should not be too great a jump between Britain's con-
tribution in the last year of the transition period and that likely 
thereafter when the system  of Community resources was  ap-
plied automatically and in full, nor should there be too rapid a 
rise during the transition period. To achieve this aim, while at 
the same time ensuring progressivity, the initial contribution of 
applicant states should be determined. 
Britain  reiterated  its  position on Community financing,  as 
expressed in  December 1970. The Six noted Britain's declara-
tions. 
Special Cases 
Sugar:  Britain's quota commitments to the Commonwealth ex-
pire at the end of 1974, when the transitional provisions on the 
Community's sugar market organization are due to end and the 
second  Yaounde  Convention  is  due  to  be  renegotiated.  This 
being so, the Commission considers that it would be better to 
defer consideration of the problem as  a whole.  Britain would 
honor its  quota commitments for five  years.  The Community 
would  continue  its  present  agricultural  policy;  however,  the 
enlarged European Community would have to discuss the whole 
of its sugar policy, making adequate allowance for developing 
countries  (in  the Commonwealth or among the Community's 
18  associates  in  Africa).  In exchange,  Britain  would  have  to 
undertake not to  increase  its  national  production  during  the 
transition period. 
New Zealand Dairy Products. The British  market is  essential 
for  New  Zealand  butter exports  which  benefit  from  certain 
commitments on quantities and prices.  On the other hand, it 
would be  difficult to envisage permanent and limitless excep-
tions. They would not be easy to defend in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT)  (New Zealand is not con-
sidered  a  developing  country)  and  would  constitute  a  dan-
gerous precedent.  However, New Zealand's interests must be 
borne in mind in the negotiations. 
Consequently, the Commission proposed: 
•  a reduction by half of Britain's quota commitments for New 
Zealand butter exports over five  years, together with complete 
abolition of quantity commitments for Cheddar cheese by the 
end of this period; 
•  on enlargement of the Community, negotiation of an inter-
national agreement on dairy products. If no world agreement 
of this type had been arrived at by the end of the five-year tran-
sition  period,  the  enlarged  Community  would  decide  what 
measures should be taken (for example, of a financial nature). 
Institutional Aspects 
It is  evident that applicants should be  entitled to  participate 
fully  in  decision-making  as  soon  as  they  become  members. 
However,  there  is  the  question  whether  new  member  states 
should take part in certain decisions that do not apply to them. 
The Commission considers it impossible to distinguish between 
decisions applicable to applicant states and decisions not appli-
cable to the new member countries, because Community deci-
sions affect all countries. The Commission therefore favors full 
participation by the new member states from the beginning in 
the institutional life of the enlarged Community, to the extent 
that the  transition  period would  involve  precise  mechanisms 
and a precise timetable. The Mediterranean Non -Policy 
President Nixon and the European Parliament agree  on  one 
thing:  the  European  Community's  preferential  and  associa-
tion  agreements  with  Mediterranean  states  are  not  satisfac-
tory.  Agreement ends there,  however. 
In the eyes of the United States, the Community's prefer-
ences tend to  be discriminatory and contrary to the principle 
of free  trade.  The European Parliament,  and  particularly its 
Political  and Foreign Economic Relations Committees, think 
that the agreements should be coordinated and combined with 
a  common  development  aid  policy  within  the  context  of  a 
broader  conception  of the  European  Community's  political 
role in  the Mediterranean. 
The Political Committee of the European Parliament pub-
lished  its  opinion  on the  Community's  political  responsibili-
ties in the Mediterranean, on February 8.  In its statement, the 
Political Committee took note of, and generally  agreed  with, 
the  suggestions  of the Parliament's Foreign  Economic  Rela-
tions Committee, which were  as  follows: 
•  orient Community commercial policy in  the Mediterranean 
by  product  rather  than  by  individual  country  for  greater 
harmonization 
•  grant technical and financial development aid on a regional 
basis similar to the Yaounde Convention for the 18  associated 
African countries 
•  begin informal consultations with  the Mediterranean states 
regarding the harmonization of production and markets, labor 
migration  into  the  Community,  and  an  offer  of Community 
technical aid. 
Toward  a Stable  Mediterranean 
The European Community has a vital  interest in  the mainte-
nance of peace in the Mediterranean. According to the Politi-
cal  Committee of the  European Parliament,  the  Community 
and  the other Mediterranean  countries  should  have  primary 
responsibility  for  peace-keeping  in  that  part  of  the  world. 
France  and  Italy  border  on  the  Mediterranean;  Germany, 
Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and  Luxembourg  have  become 
Mediterranean  neighbors  through  membership  in  the  Com-
munity. 
The Political Committee saw  two  threats  to  peace  in  the 
Mediterranean:  the Middle East conflict and the presence of 
the  Soviet  navy,  including  the  installation  of bases  for  the 
Soviet fleet  in  certain  Mediterranean countries. If the  Com-
munity  had  been  a  political  power  early  enough,  it  might 
have  been  able  to  prevent  the  establishment  of enemy posi-
tions  by  the two superpowers in  the  Mediterranean, with  its 
attendant danger of provoking a world conflict,  the Commit-
tee said. 
The Community is  not yet, however, a single political unit 
and its limited tariff preferences cannot by themselves play a 
decisive  role  in  maintaining peace  in  the Mediterranean.  On 
the  other hand,  the  proper commercial  policy  might help to 
bring about solidarity among the Mediterranean countries by 
making them  aware of their common interests. 
The  Politics  of Economics 
Diversity in  the current preferential agreements with Mediter-
ranean countries has various sources. The political  affinity of 
the  Community for  certain of these  states,  the political  and 
economic interests of the Community as  a whole,  and the in-
terests of certain influential member states helped to determine 
the  nature of the  agreements.  There was  also  initially,  per-
haps,  a tendency to catalogue the countries  according to  the 
level  of "democracy"  in  their government and  to  encourage 
them at the same time  to make the desired political changes. 
The Political  Committee doubted  that these  methods  helped 
to  obtain the desired objective. 
The  Political  Committee  supported  the  suggestions  of the 
Foreign- Economic Relations Committee for better policy co-
ordination. The restructuring of commercial policy with effec-
tive technical aid coordinated for the whole region and multi-
lateral consultations among the Mediterranean countries on  a 
variety of questions would  meet the necessary conditions for 
peace and harmony in  the Mediterranean basin, the Commit-
tee said. 
A common development policy toward this area is  particu-
larly  important.  The Committee  referred  to  the  opinion  ex-
pressed by Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf before the Political 
Committee on  November 30,  1970:  that contributing to  the 
Arab countries' industrial development would ease the search 
for a solution acceptable to all  parties involved  in  the Middle 
East conflict. At the same time, the Committee said, Commu-
nity member states should refrain from  pursuing independent 
development  policies  that  conflict  with  the  Community's 
policy. 
Maghreb  Also  is  Concerned 
The Community is  not the only group concerned with  Medi-
terranean stability, the Political Committee stated. The Tunis-
ian  magazine  "Young Africa" recently  proposed  the  conclu-
sion of an agreement between Italy, France, and Spain on the 
European  side  and  Tunisia,  Algeria  and  Morocco  on  the 
African  side  to: 
•  prepare a common  defense of the Mediterranean north of 
Gibraltar and Sicily 
•  help the Maghreb (the North African states)  preserve their 
independence  from  military  blocs  to  the  point  of  keeping 
foreign  military bases out of their territory. 
This proposal, which would have been unthinkable only a few 
years  ago,  the  Committee  said,  shows  that  other  Mediter-
ranean states are becoming more and more aware of the need 
for tightening regional cooperation, possibly including an  alli-
ance  of  all  Mediterranean  states  to  preserve  their  inde-
pendence. 
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MALFA TTl  TO  SEE  NIXON  GERMAN  PUBLIC  FAVORS  U.S.  TIES,  OSTPOLITIK 
Franco Maria Malfatti, President of the Com-
mission  of the European Communities,  will 
meet President Richard M. Nixon on April 6, 
1971, at the White House, it was announced 
on February 22 in Brussels. The visit of Pres-
ident Malfatti follows an invitation by Presi-
dent Nixon. 
During  his  official  visit  to  Washington, 
President Malfatti will also have other meet-
ings with high Administration officials. 
1970:  INCREASE  IN  U.S. 
TRADE  WITH  COMMUNITY 
U.S.-Community trade grew  by  21  per cent 
between 1969 and 1970. 
The attitude of the German public toward the 
Soviet Union has changed  dramatically since 
1953,  but  not  towards  the  United  States, 
which is  still  the favorite. 
A  recent  opinion  poll  conducted  by  the 
Institut fiir  Demoskopie  d'AIIensbach  (Ger-
many's equivalent to Gallup) found that Ger-
mans favor close cooperation with the United 
States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union 
in  that order.  Since  1953,  Italy, Japan,  and 
Spain have dropped below the rating for the 
Soviet Union. 
Whereas in  1953  18 per cent of those polled 
favored close cooperation with the Soviet Un-
ion, 52  per cent do today. The United States 
has consistently remained the "most favored" 
nation in German eyes-8 out of 10 Germans 
favoring  close  ties  with  their  nuclear  NATO 
partner~xcept in  1967,  when  French  ties 
were more popular. 
Franco-German Relations 
France  and  Britain  both  lost  popularity  in 
1956  at the  time  of the Suez  Crisis.  France 
has  become  increasingly  important  to  the 
Germans since  1953, however, varying from 
a 55 per cent to a 75 per cent rating by those 
polled  who  favor  close  ties.  Britain's  rating 
is the same today as in 1953-62 per cent. 
The  growth  of  Soviet  popularity  reflects 
popular  German  support  for  Chancellor 
Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik, policy toward 
the  East.  The  change  was  particularly  dra-
matic during 1970: in  April only 32  per cent 
of those  polled  favored  close  ties  with  the 
Soviet Union, while in November 52  per cent 
did. 
According to  figures  released  in February 
by  the  U.S.  Commerce  Department,  U.S. 
agricultural  exports  to the  European  Com-
munity increased by 23 per cent in  1970. 
QUESTION:  With which of the following countries should we cooperate most closely? 
U.S.  TRADE  WITH THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY  (in  millions of dollars) 
Increase 
Category  1970  1969  Percentage 
Total U.S. 
Exports to 
Community  8,325  6,875.1  21 
U.S. Agricul-
tural Exports 
to  EC  1,558.8  1,268.6  23 
Total U.S. Im-
ports From 
Community  6,611.8  5,800.1  14 
U.S.  Agricul-
tural Imports 
from  EC  423.5  362.9  17 
(percentages of favorable replies) 
1953  1954  1956 
Mar.  Aug.  Dec. 
United  States  83  78  84 
France  55  46  42 
Great Britain  62  58  39 
U.S.S.R.  18  22  18 
Japan  42  35  31 
Italy  44  34  30 
Poland  11  11  17 
Israel  15  13  9 
Spain  50  42  28 
Other countries (not 
a  precise  response)  8  14  11 
388  353  309 
U.S.  REAFFIRMS  SUPPORT  FOR  U.K.  MEMBERSHIP 
U.S.  support  for  enlargement of the  Com-
munity was reaffirmed in Brussels in January 
by  U.S.  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Economic Affairs Philip H. Trezise. He said 
that  the  United  States  coupled  its  support 
for  an  enlarged  Community  with  a  deter-
mination  to  protect  its  trade  interests. 
Mr.  Trezise  headed  an American delega-
tion which held talks on January 18  and 19 
with  Community  officials  on  trade  policy 
questions.  The  consultations,  described  by 
both  sides  as  frank  and  cordial,  were  pri-
marily  a  follow-up  of  talks  held  in  Wash-
ington  last  October  with  Community  of-
ficials. 
Mr. Trezise said that a major U.S. concern 
was  the  prospect  of  the  extension  of  the 
Community's  common  agricultural  policy 
to Britain at current Community price levels. 
In  this  eventuality,  U.S.  officials  have  ex-
pressed concern  about damage to U.S.  agri-
cultural  exports,  particularly  grain.  There 
was  also  anxiety,  he  added,  about the pos-
sible  inclusion  of  Commonwealth  countries 
in  the  Community's  system  of  association 
agreements,  which  provide  for  preferential 
trade arrangements. 
The U.S.-Community consultations center-
ed on the Community's new tobacco regula-
tions,  which  give  preferential  treatment  to 
Community-produced tobacco,  and on those 
espects of the Community's agreements with 
Morocco, Spain, Israel, and Tunisia that give 
preferential  treatment  to  citrus  fruit  ex-
ported  to  the  Common  Market  from  these 
Mediterranean· countries.  The United  States 
is  a  major  exporter  of  both  tobacco  and 
citrus fruits. 
The  United  States  considers  the  prefer-
ential  arrangements  with  the  four  Mediter-
1959  1962  1963  1967  1970  1970 
Sept.  June  Aug.  Jan.  Apr.  Nov. 
81  82  90  72  80  86 
48  60  70  76  58  75 
49  54  65  52  50  62 
31  22  27  41  32  52 
32  31  31  22  28  43 
31  36  30  22  22  36 
25  22  27  27  19  35 
19  18  17  16  14  24 
27  27  20  18  12  23 
13  12  3  3  2  2 
356  364  380  349  317  437 
ranean  countries  as  inconsistent  with  the 
regulations  governing  the  General  Agree-
ment  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GAIT)  in 
Geneva.  Mr.  Trezise  indicated  that  the 
United  States  was  prepared  to  take  the 
tobacco  and  citrus  issues  to  the  GATT,  but 
would  prefer  "to  resolve  the  matters  bi-
laterally" with the Community. He noted the 
continuing  expansion  of  U.S.-Community 
trade.  U.S.  exports  to  the  Community  in 
1970 reached an estimated $8  billion, giving 
the  United  States  a  projected  trade  surplus 
of about  $2  billion. 
CORRIGENDUM 
The graph "Ec Trade with the United States" 
on page  24  of the February 1971  issue,  the 
line labelled "Ec Exports to usA" should read 
"Ec Imports from usA." and vice versa. EUROPEAN  CHEESES  FAIL 
U.S.  ENTRANCE  EXAMS 
U.S.  sanitary  controls  have  been  keeping 
some  European  cheeses  out of  the  United 
States. 
The  Commission  of  the  European  Com-
munities  on  February  16  said  that  it  had 
asked the  General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs  (GATT)  to decide whether U.S.  sani-
tary controls on cheese imports constituted a 
non-tariff trade barrier. Answering a written 
question from Mariano Pintus, Italian Chris-
tian  Democrat  member  of  the  European 
Parliament,  the  Commission  also  said  it in-
tended to raise the question in bilateral talks. 
Contradictory U.S. Analyses 
European cheeses of various  types  were  re-
jected by the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration  in  1969 and  1970 for containing too 
high  a pesticide residue. Noting the large lots 
of  Italian  cheeses  that  were  rejected,  Mr. 
Pintus stated  that U.S.  laboratories  use  dif-
ferent  methods of analysis which often lead 
to contradictory results,  rejecting portions of 
a  shipment  of cheeses  from  a  single  area, 
while authorizing the importation of the rest. 
European cheese  producers cannot test their 
cheese before export because U.S. labs are not 
consistent  in  the  substances  for  which  they 
test. Mr. Pintus said. 
TRADE  WITH  EASTERN 
EUROPE:  COMMON  FRONT? 
Bilateral  trade  agreements  with  East Euro-
pean  countries  constitute one of the  major 
dilemmas facing the European Community's 
common commercial policy. 
In  reply  to  a  question  from  Cornelis 
Berkhouwer,  Dutch  Liberal  member of the 
European  Parliament,  the  Commission  of 
the European Community stated on February 
16  that the reinforcement and expansion of 
commercial and economic relations with the 
countries of Eastern Europe would serve the 
interests of peace in  Europe. In the absence 
of  a  common  commercial  policy  for  this 
geographical  area,  renegotiation  of member 
countries'  bilateral  trade  agreements  with 
Eastern  Europe  is  subject  to  Council  ap-
proval. 
Asked  whether  the  Commission  and  the 
Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance 
(COMECON)  might  usefully  negotiate  di-
rectly  with  each  other,  the  Commission 
suggested that it would be difficult.  The two 
institutions  are  organized  and  oriented  in 
entirely  different  ways.  COMECON,  lacking 
anything  comparable  to  the  Commission, 
merely coordinates national production plans 
within  Eastern  Europe. 
COMMON TAX  RATE 
PROPOSED ON NEW CAPITAL 
A  common  tax  rate of  1  per cent  on  new 
corporate capital was proposed by the Com-
mission  of  the  European  Communities  on 
January 29. 
A  rate of  .5  per  cent  was  proposed  for 
capital  transfers  involving  regrouping  of 
companies. If  passed by the Council of Minis-
ters,  these new rates would become effective 
on January 1,  1974. 
The United States does not tax new corpo-
rate capital which is considered to be a pro-
ductive investment. In its proposal, the Com-
mission  noted  that  this  tax  did  not  make 
economic sense. For this reason, the Commis-
sion decided upon the rates of 1 per cent and 
.50 per cent, both low enough  to  allow  the 
common capital market to develop but high 
enough to take the member states' budgetary 
needs into consideration. 
COMMISSION  SUGGESTS 
NEW  FEED  REGULATIONS 
The European consumer may soon be better 
protected  from  the  effects  of contaminated 
animal feeds. 
To complete the harmonization of animal 
feed regulations, the Commission of the Euro-
pean Community has proposed two new reg-
ulations to the Council. One would fix  maxi-
mum percentages of "undesirable" substances 
in animal feeds, while the other would regu-
late the sale  of feeds. 
The Council established a permanent com-
mittee on animal feeds  in  July  1970 and is-
sued  a  directive  on  sampling  and  analysis 
methods for inspecting these feeds. In Novem-
ber 1970 another directive was issued to reg-
ulate additives. 
The new  proposals would  place limits on 
acceptable  quantities  of  undesirable  sub-
stances in  animal feeds.  Some substances, as 
arsenic in hay, exist naturally in the products 
used  to  prepare  the  feeds  and  cannot  be 
eliminated entirely. The proposed regulations 
would  also  define  various animal  feeds  and 
fix  quality  standards  for  them.  A  uniform 
labeling system  is  suggested for all feeds. 
INSPECTIONS,  HEALTH 
REGULATIONS  FOR  MILK 
Cows may soon need the European Commun-
nity's stamp of approval at least once a year, 
and their milk once a  month. 
The  Commission  of the  European  Com-
munities submitted two new proposals to the 
Council  on  February  5  suggesting  health 
regulations  for  both  raw  and  pasteurized 
milk. The regulations would help to remove 
current obstacles to trade caused by varying 
legislation  in  this  field  among  the  member 
states. 
The regulations, if adopted by the Council, 
will become effective immediately for exports 
and by 1975 for domestic milk. All cows will 
undergo an annual udder inspection and their 
milk will  be analyzed at least once a month. 
Dairies will  also  need  special  authorization. 
Member states may refuse to  import below-
standard  milk.  However,  the  exporter  may 
protest  and call for an inspection by a  neu-
tral  expert.  Each  state  wilL  be  required  to 
notify  the  other  states  and  the Commission 
of an  epidemic outbreak.  Where  there  is  a 
danger of an epidemic, other states may close 
their borders to milk from the  affected area 
or the whole country. 
Quality grades for milk and milk products 
may be established later. 
THE  MONTH  IN  BRIEF 
February 1971 
1  The Council of Ministers met in  Brussels 
mainly  to  discuss  progress  in  negotiations 
for the United Kingdom's membership in the 
Community (see page 14). 
•  The  common  fisheries  policy  came  into 
force.  (See  European  Community  No.  140, 
page 24.) 
2  Negotiations  with  the  United  Kingdom 
continued in Brussels at ministerial level. 
5  The  decision  reorganizing  the  European 
Social Fund came into force. (See  European 
Community No. 141, page 21.) 
8-9  The Council of Ministers  agreed  to  go 
ahead with plans for achieving economic and 
monetary union before 1980 (see  pages 3-5 ). 
8-12  The European Parliament met in Stras-
bourg, France (see page 20). 
15-16 The Council of Ministers met to con-
tinue  discussions  of  plans  to  reform  the 
structure of farming (see  page  12 ). 
17  Negotiations continued with  Austria for 
an  "interim  agreement,"  valid  until  overall 
arrangements  could  be  made  on  relations 
with  other members  of the  European  Free 
Trade Association that have not applied for 
Community membership. 
•  German  Foreign  Minister  Walter  Scheel 
met with President Richard M. Nixon at the 
White House. 
20  Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo 
ended a  three-day visit during which he met 
with President Nixon at the White House. 
23-24  Membership  negotiations  continued 
with  the  United  Kingdom  at  deputy  level, 
and  Commission  President  Franco  Maria 
Malfatti  began  a  three-day  official  visit  to 
Norway.  19 POLICY  CHANGES  DEBATED  IN  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  Dahrendorf Differs 
Forthcoming  changes  in  Common  Market 
commercial,  industrial,  and  agricultural 
policy  occupied  the  European  Parliament, 
meeting in Strasbourg on February 8-15. 
A report dealing with the European Com-
munity's  commercial  policy  in  the  Mediter-
ranean Basin was presented the second day of 
the session by Andre Rossi  (French Liberal) 
speaking for the Parliament's Committee on 
Foreign  Economic  Relations.  Mr.  Rossi 
Commission President Franco Maria Malfatti 
stated that the Community's ~conomic agree-
ments  with  countries  in  the  Mediterranean 
area failed to meet the region's development 
needs.  Other  speakers  concurred,  asserting 
that the Community's political presence in the 
Mediterranean  basin  was  not  related  to  its 
commercial  policy.  Solutions  proposed  in-
cluded  the adoption of a  commercial policy 
based on  products rather than countries  (see 
page 17). 
Ralf Dahrendorf, member of the Commission 
of the  European Communities,  stressed  the 
importance of interdependence as a  guaran-
tee of the complete independence of the Com-
munity's trading partners.  He recommended 
a wider aplication of the Six's Mediterranean 
policy  and  cooperation  beyond  the  purely 
commercial framework. 
After  debate,  the  Parliament  adopted  a 
resolution urging the member states' foreign 
ministers  to  develop  a  coherent  policy  to-
wards  the  Mediterranean  countries.  Special 
Michel Cointat, French Gaullist 
member of the European Parliament 
Roland Boscary-Monsservin, 
French Liberal member of the 
European Parliament 
Hans Richarts, German 
Christian Democrat member of the 
European Parliament 
Commission member Altiero Spinelli 
20 
Commission Vice President 
Sicco L. Mansholt  Commission member Albert Coppe attention would  be given  to  coordinating ef-
forts to preserve peace  which the Parliament 
feels  is  jeopardized  by  the  heavy  concentra-
tion  of military force  in  the area. 
Industrial Policy Discussed 
Common  Market  industrial policy  was  also 
the subject of prolonged debate, on the basis 
of a report presented by Parliament member 
Gerd Springorum (German Christian Demo-
crat) on a Commission memorandum to the 
Council of Ministers. 
Mr.  Springorum  felt  it  was  too  soon  to 
assess  the  effectiveness  of the  Community's 
industrial  policy.  He  did,  however,  recom-
mend that member states try to correlate in-
dustrial policy more closely with general eco-
nomic  policy  and  suggested  three  points of 
possible action for the Community: 
•  removal  of obstacles to  the  development 
of enterprises of a  European scale 
•  elimination of protectionist measures 
•  cultivation  of an  awareness  of industrial 
development's effects on society as a whole 
•  enactment of laws at the Community level 
to  combat  pollution  and  the  destruction  of 
natural resources. 
Competition and Concentration 
Also  discussed  at  length  were  problems 
created  by  economic  competition  and  con-
centration  within  the  Common Market.  Al-
bert  Borschette,  Commission  member  with 
special  responsibility for competition policy, 
commented  on a  report  on  this  subject  by 
Cornelis  Berkhouwer,  Dutch  Liberal  mem-
ber of the European Parliament. 
Mr.  Borschette  said  it  was  the  responsi-
bility  of  the  press  to publicize  Commission 
decisions  on  competition.  He endorsed  Mr. 
Berkhouwer's  suggestion  that  the  Commis-
sion  present an annual report to  the  Parlia-
ment on  changes  in  the Community's com-
petition  policy. 
Mr.  Borschette  also  reminded the  Parlia-
ment  about  the  Commission's  industrial 
policy  memorandum,  urging  improvements 
in  Community-level legislation on economic 
concentration. He criticized the extravagance 
of state and regional aid to industry for being 
useless and distorting competition. 
Fears for Farmers 
Prices, inflation, jobs for ex-farmers, and the 
deficit  position of Common Market agricul-
ture were among the subjects reviewed during 
the debate on Community agricultural policy. 
Michel  Cointat, French Minister of Agri-
culture  and  member  of  the  Community's 
Council of Ministers, stressed the necessity of 
improving  the  structure  of prices.  He wel-
comed the Commission's plans to submit new 
proposals for reform of the common agricul-
tural policy. 
Commenting on the effects of inflation on 
Community agriculture, Hans Richarts, Ger-
man  Christian  Democrat  member  of  the 
European  Parliament,  stated  that  not  only 
inflation but also the lack of regional  mone-
tary policy and the absence of a global agri-
cultural  policy  contribute  to  the  currently 
depressed  position  of  Community  farming. 
In  his  opinion,  the  success  of  agricultural 
reform  will  largely  depend  on  the  creation 
of new jobs for farmers who leave the land. 
Explaining  to  the  Parliament  the  new 
orientation of the common agricultural pol-
icy,  Sicco  L.  Mansholt,  Commission  Vice 
President with special responsibility for agri-
culture,  gave  his  views  on  changes  in  the 
price structure, supplementary revenues, and 
regional flexibility. 
Regarding  price  changes,  Mr.  Mansholt 
declared  that  economic  policy  constitutes 
only one part of the problem. Development 
of social policy must be considered as  well. 
The Parliament also reached a decision on 
the  matter  of  financial  aid  to  farmers.  A 
farmer requesting aid for modernization must 
prove  a  minimum  net  income  of $3,300  to 
$4,100,  instead  of  the  $10,000  to  $12:500 
gross suggested by the Commission. 
Jean De Lipkowski, Acting Chairman of the 
Communities Council of Ministers 
RESEARCH  GROUP  TO 
CONSULT  INDUSTRY 
The Six have agreed to allow Finland, Greece, 
and Yugoslavia to  take part in the Commu-
nity's  work  on  European  scientific  coopera-
tion.  Nine other countries-Austria, Britain, 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland-already participate 
in these discussions. 
In January, senior research officials of the 
15  European  countries  decided  to  spend 
$30,000 on a study by the European Confer-
ence on Posts and Telecommunications (CEPT) 
of telecommunication requirements in  1985. 
Tn  particular,  the  senior  officials  of the  15 
countries  reviewed  the  work  of  the  study 
groups responsible for preparing the  ground 
for decisions to carry out concrete projects. 
Meanwhile,  the  Community's  Scientific 
and Technical Research Policy Group has in-
formed  the Union of Industries of the Euro-
pean Community (UNICE)  and the European 
Center for  Public Undertakings  (CEEP)  that 
the Council of Ministers has asked the Group 
to  consult  industry  on  European  scientific 
cooperation. 
The first  stage of the group's work relates 
to data-processing, telecommunications, met-
allurgy,  new  means  of  transport,  oceanog-
raphy,  meteorology,  and  pollution.  Industry 
will  be  asked  to  help  to  prepare programs 
and  ways of carrying out joint projects. 
The  Group will  consult  industrialists  on: 
•  general  questions,  such  as  transfers  and 
exchange of information, joint  projects,  and 
industrial property 
•  specific questions, such as opportunities for 
cooperation, projects for  joint action  in  spe-
cific  fields,  technological  forecasts,  and  the 
advisability of initiating cooperative research 
programs. 
U.S.  INTEREST  RATES 
NOT  THE  ONLY  CULPRIT 
Inflationary pressures in Europe are not due 
solely to U.S. actions, according to the Corn-
mission of the European Communities. 
Answering a question from Adriaan Oele, 
Dutch  Socialist  member  of  the  European 
Parliament, the Commission stated on Janu-
ary 22  that recent reductions in the U.S. dis-
count rate have helped to attract short-term 
capital  to  Germany  and  the  Netherlands, 
complicating but not causing their economic 
problems. Inflationary pressures in both states 
are largely of domestic origin, the Commis-
sion said. 
The Commission said  it was following de-
velopments in  American monetary policy, as 
shifts  in  speculative  currencies would  affect 
the Community's economic policy.  21 22 
EC  ROAD  SAFETY  PROGRAM 
CURRENTLY  UNDER  STUDY 
A crash program for road safety and the con-
struction of a European "safety car" is  being 
studied by the Commission of the European 
Communities. 
In  response  to  a  written  question  from 
Horst Seefeld, German Socialist member of 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Commission 
outlined proposals for a 2,000-pound "safety 
car." It hopes to  explore the project and  ef-
forts  to  coordinate  its  development  at  the 
Community level in future meetings with the 
Liaison Committee for the Motor Industry. 
Two Types of Safety 
Highway  safety  can  be  approached  in  two 
ways: 
•  actively  through preventive safety, reduc-
ing the causes of accidents 
•  passively, through protective safety, limit-
ing  the effects of accidents. 
To  improve  existing  vehicle  components, 
the Commission recommended concentration 
on development of: 
•  active programs, such as improved braking 
systems,  roadholding, and steering 
•  passive  safety  measures  involving  im-
provements in  the design of internal and ex-
ternal fittings, air bags, and safety belts. 
Already under examination  by the Work-
ing  Groups on Technical  and Scientific  Re-
search  Policy  is  a  project for  setting  up  an 
integrated  system  of electronic  aids  to help 
control  the  flow  of road  traffic. In  addition 
to  the  Six,  nine  non-Community  countries 
are participating. 
Human Factor 
The general program will  also cover the hu-
man factor--Community-wide standards for 
alcohol levels, conditions governing the issu-
ing  and revocation of driving licenses,  road-
safety education in  schools, and  speed limits. 
Eight  of  the  Commission's  proposals for 
directives on the safety program have already 
been  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
Within the next few months the Commission 
said it  planned to  submit a memorandum on 
the  program  to  the  European  Parliament's 
Transport Committee. 
A "POLITICAL"  FOREIGN 
POLICY  FOR  THE  SIX? 
The European Community has more than an 
economic role to play in  the world; it  is  al-
ready a political entity having political influ-
ence beyond its own borders. 
Ralf Dahrendorf, member of the Commis-
sion  of the European Communities  respon-
sible for foreign affairs, noted at a meeting of 
the German Foreign Affairs Society,  in  Bad 
Godesberg  on  January  25,  that  the  Com-
munity often seems unaware of its political 
influence.  Even  though  the  Community's 
preferential  and association agreements may 
be  limited  to  tariff  reductions  for  certain 
products,  they  have  a  political  importance 
that goes far beyond their economic content, 
he said. 
Political union is nothing new to the Com-
munities,  but  rather  a  process  begun  long 
ago that has not yet been completed. Accord-
ing to Mr. Dahrendorf, the incomplete nature 
of the Community's political instruments ac-
counts  for  the  large  discrepancy  between 
Community action and influence. It is  not a 
question  now  of  creating  new  theories  of 
Europe  or  modifying  the  Communities 
treaties,  he said,  but  rather  of  recognizing 
Community responsibilities  within  the exist-
ing  reality  and reflecting  this  recognition in 
Community decisions. 
TOWARD  A COMMON 
DRIVER'S  LICENSE 
A common driver's license valid  throughout 
the European Community is  in the works. 
The Commission  of the  European  Com-
munities stated on February 4 that it planned 
to  make  a  proposal  for  a  common driver's 
license to the Council during  1971. The first 
stage in  the coordination of Community driv-
ers'  licenses  would  be  a  harmonization  of 
conditions  for  issuing  and  withdrawing  a 
license. It would include the reciprocal recog-
nition  of national drivers' licenses anywhere 
within  the Community. 
At a  later  stage,  the Commission  said,  it 
hoped a  single  driver's license for the entire 
Community could be adopted. 
TO  CLOSE  TECHNOLOGY 
GAP:  BETTER  MANAGEMENT 
The European firm  uses  three to four times 
less brainpower work than the American firm. 
Europe's technological development is  not 
hampered  by a  lack of scientific discoveries 
but  rather  by  a  shortage  of  management 
trained to put these  discoveries to use.  This 
opinion  was  offered  to  the  Commission  of 
the European Communities on January 25 by 
the  International  Confederation  of  Execu-
tives (  CIC), representing management person-
nel  and  executives  in  the  six  Community 
countries. 
The CIC supported the Commission's pro-
posal to  create a European Management and 
Training Foundation.  It also  suggested  that 
social  security  and  retirement  systems  be 
harmonized among the Six  and  that mutual 
recognition of diplomas be introduced to en-
courage managerial  mobility  throughout the 
Community. 
The Confederation of Executives also  en-
dorsed the rapid conclusion of entry negotia-
tions  with  the  United  Kingdom  and  other 
candidates,  the  acceleration  of Community 
integration,  the  strengthening  of  economic 
and monetary ties with the United States, and 
the  enlargement  of  the  Commission's  role 
within  the European Community. 
COMMISSION  STUDIES 
LEAD  IN  CAR  EXHAUST 
Eyes  are smarting in  Europe, too. 
The Commission of the European Commu-
nities stated on January 19 in reply to a ques-
tion  from  Adriaan  Oele,  Dutch  Socialist 
member of the European Parliament, that it 
was  investigating  the exhaust effects  of lead 
in  automobile  gasoline.  Once  the  necessary 
information has  been  studied  the  Commis-
sion  will  suggest measures  to  deal with  this 
problem within the Community. 
Only one of the six  Community member 
countries  now  plans  to set  maximum limits 
for  the lead content of automobile gasoline, 
the Commission said. Difference among mem-
ber nations' legislation in  this field,  however, 
might have a  negative impact on both trade 
and travel within the Community. 
The  Commission  therefore  plans  to  ex-
amine the extent to which harmonization of 
national regulations in this field is necessary. 
It will  then  make proposals  to the  Council 
designed to protect both the environment and 
Community trade. 
HEAD  OF  EURATOM  JOINT 
RESEARCH  CENTER  NAMED 
Pietro  Caprioglio  was  named  Director 
General  of  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community's  Joint  Research  Center  on 
February  5.  The  Joint  Research  Center 
consists  of  Euratom's  establishments  at 
Tspra  (Italy),  Gee!  (Belgium),  Karlsruhe 
(Germany),  and  Petten  (Holland).  The 
Director  General's  offices  will  be  at  Ispra, 
the  most  important  of  the  four  research 
centers. 
The  appointment  of Mr.  Caprioglio  fol-
lows the Commission's decision, made at the 
end of January, to  grant greater functional 
autonomy to the Joint Research Center-part 
of the  Commission's general  plan  approved 
last  December  by the  Council of Ministers 
for restructuring the Joint Research Center. 
Mr. Caprioglio was born on April 28, 1929, 
in Rome. Between 1957 and 1967, be worked 
first with AGIP Nucleare and then at Euratom. 
From July 1967 to March 1969 he was direc-
tor of the Societa Progettazioni Mecchaniche 
Nucleari,  part  of  the  IRI  (lnstituto  per  Ia 
Ricostruzione Tndustriale) group. He then re-
turned to Euratom as director of the  Ispra 
establishment on April  1,  1969. INVESTMENT  BANK  ISSUES 
BONDS  IN  GERMANY 
The  European  Investment  Bank  has  issued 
bonds  worth  $27.3  million  on  the  German 
capital market. 
On February 11,  the Bank announced that 
it had concluded a contract in Frankfurt for 
its  seventh  public  bond  issue  in  Germany, 
bringing  its  total of bond  issues  in  German 
marks  to  over $180  million.  The Bank will 
use the proceeds from the sale of the bonds 
for  its  ordinary  lending  operations. 
The 15-year bonds bear an  annual interest 
rate of 7.5  per cent,  payable  semi-annually. 
After  a  five-year  grace  period,  they  will  be 
redeemable at par in  10 equal annual install-
ments. The bond issue has been underwritten 
by  a consortium of German banks. 
EC  INSURANCE  SALESMEN 
TO  GAIN  MORE  FREEDOM 
Insurance  agents  and  brokers  in  European 
Community countries  may  soon  be  able to 
sell policies anywhere in  the Common Mar-
ket. 
The  first  of  two  Commission  proposals 
for  directives  recently  submitted  to  the 
Council  of Ministers  would  abolish  existing 
restrictions on freedom of establishment for 
Community  insurance  agents  and  brokers. 
The  second  proposal  contains  transitional 
measures. 
Agents'  practices  are  now  subject  to 
regulation  in  the  Netherlands,  France,  and 
Belgium,  but  not  in  Germany or Italy.  In 
Luxembourg,  brokers'  activities  are  pro-
hibited  outright,  while  agents'  activities  are 
unregulated. 
SIX  TO  COOPERATE  ON 
INTERNATIONAL  PATENTS 
International patents  should  soon  be  easier 
to  obtain in all six member countries of the 
European  Community. 
The  Six  and  29  other  countries  have 
signed a Patent Cooperation Treaty, the U.S. 
State  Department announced on January 5. 
The Treaty was open for signature in Wash-
ington  from  June  19  until  December  31, 
1970, following the close of the Washington 
Diplomatic Conference on patents last June. 
The  first  world-wide  treaty  for  patent 
cooperation  will  institute  a  central  filing 
procedure  and  standardize  international 
patent  applications  so  that  the  same  in-
vention  will  not have to  be filed  separately 
in each country, as is  currently required. 
The new  Patent  Cooperation  Treaty  will 
come  into  force  after  eight  states  have 
ratified  the  agreement.  Four of these  coun-
tries  must  be  among  those  states  with  the 
highest  number  of  patent  applications. 
RECENT BOOKS ON 
COMMUNITY TOPICS 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  periodically  lists 
books dealing with Community and Atlantic 
topics.  Prices  are  also  given,  whenever 
known.  This  presentation  does  not  indicate 
approval  or recommendation of these publi-
cations  which  can  be  purchased  or ordered 
from  most  booksellers. 
Challenge  and  Respon~e: A  Programme for 
Europe.  By  Franz Josef Strauss. Weidenfeld 
and  Nicolson,  London,  1969.  175  pages. 
An  analysis  of  political  problems  facing 
Europe today with foreword by Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber. 
As  a  "Europeanist," the  author maintains 
that  Europe must  unify  into  a  strong  com-
munity  of nations  to  combat  the  constantly 
growing efficiency and  domination of the su-
perpowers. He discusses such topics as relaxa-
tion  of tension  among the great powers, the 
technology gap, and the challenge of China. 
British  Politics  and  European  Unity.  By 
Robert  J.  Lieber.  University  of  California 
Press,  Berkeley,  1970.  317  pages  with  bibli-
ography  and  index.  $9.00. 
A  review of the role of pressure groups and 
parties in  the formulation of Britain's policy 
toward European unity. 
The  author  also  puts  forth  a  theoretical 
framework for analyzing the influence of or-
ganized  economic interests on  governmental 
policy.  Included  is  a  study  of central  issues 
involving pressure group politics, political de-
cision-making,  and  integration  theory.  The 
author  examines  the  period  from  1956  to 
1967 and tries to explain why  British policy-
makers failed  to come to  terms with succes-
sive European developments. 
The Council  of Europe. Council  of Europe 
Directorate of Press and  Information. Stras-
bourg,  1970,  56  pages.  Free. 
A  booklet tracing the structure and develop-
ment of the Council of Europe and its activi-
ties in the last 20 years. 
Part I explains the Council's organization 
and purpose. Short discussions of its admin-
istration's  headquarters,  budget,  official  lan-
guages,  emblem,  and  the  workings  of  the 
Committee of Ministers, the Consultative As-
sembly, and the Secretariat are included. 
In Part II, the actual work of the Council 
is  outlined in  chapters on human rights, co-
operation  in  the legal  field, economic  ques-
tions,  social  questions,  health  and  hygiene, 
conservation, and various other topics. 
Part ITT  is a historical outline of the Coun-
cil's development from  1946,  when  Winston 
Churchill put forward his plan for a "United 
States of Europe," to the present. 
Traders and Diplomats: An  Analysis  of the 
Kennedy  Round  of  Negotiations  Under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. By 
Ernest  H.  Preeg.  The Brookings  Institution, 
Washington,  D.C.,  1970,  271  pages  with  ap-
pendices and index. 
A history of the negotiations,  analysis of the 
results,  and evaluation of the significance  of 
the Kennedy Round for future trade policy. 
The  author  discusses  the  origins  of  the 
Kennedy  Round  and  gives  a  chronological 
analysis  of the  negotiations.  He surveys  the 
results for the industrial and agricultural sec-
tors, for the reduction of tariff dispersion and 
tariff differentials,  and  for products of inter-
est  to  developing  countries.  The  post-Ken-
nedy  Round  common  external  tariff  of  the 
European Economic Community is compared 
with  the  tariffs  of  the  United  States,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  Japan.  Two  chapters 
are devoted to the impact on the negotiations 
of the  1965 crisis in the Community. In con-
clusion, the author suggests some of the Ken-
nedy  Round's implications  for  future  trade. 
De  Gaulle  and  the  Anglo-Saxons.  By  John 
Newhouse.  Viking  Press.  New  York,  1970. 
370  pages  with  reference  notes  and  index. 
$8.50 
A study of de  Gaulle's policies and attitudes 
toward  Britain and  the United  States during 
his  II years as  President of France. Drawing 
on information gathered from interviews with 
intimates of de Gaulle, diplomats, and various 
political  figures,  the  author  argues  that  de 
Gaulle's one consistent ambition was  to miti-
gate  Anglo-American  influence  in  Europe. 
and  to  replace  that  influence  with  French 
domination. 
Le  ''Plan  Foucbet"  et  le  Probleme  de 
L'Europe  Politique.  Number  5,  "Studies  in 
Contemporary European  Issues." By  Robert 
Bloes.  College  of Europe, Bruges  (Belgium), 
1970,  538  pages  with  annexes  and  bibliog-
raphy. 
A diplomatic history and analysis of the  ne-
gotiations for political union. 
The Fouchet negotiations  are examined  in 
the context of the international political situ-
ation  in  the  1960's.  U.S.-French  relations  in 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  in-
tegration in  Western Europe, and theories of 
integration are explored. The author also pre-
sents a chronological analysis of the negotia-
tions  for  political  union  and  emphasizes 
their  impact  on  U.S.-British  relations  and 
British  negotiations  for  membership  in  the 
Community. In the  concluding chapters,  the 
author  explores  the  problems  of  Europe's 
search  for  political  identity,  the  transfer  of 
allegiances and values, and Europe's  role.  23 PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE 
NATIONAL  ACCOUNTS  1959-1969.  Statistical 
Office of the European Communities. Luxem-
bourg,  1970, 247  pages .......................... $3.00 
French/German  text  with  detailed  Enrdish 
Table of Contents. 1959-1969 yearbook of 
national accoums data for  the member coun-
tries of the Community as  well as certain ac-
counts aggregates  for  the  United Kin{?dom, 
United States, and Japan.  Includes a chapter 
on the Community as a  whole.  Detailed sta-
tistics cover gross national product at market 
and constant prices,  gross domestic  product, 
population and employment, national income, 
wages  and salaries,  primte and  public  con-
sumption, gross fixed asset formation, exports 
and imports of goods and services,  and na-
tional sat·ings. Includes a ne11· section on each 
member state's financial accounts from  1965-
1969. 
ADDRESS  BY  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  COMMIS-
SION  BEFORE  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT. 
Commission  of tlze  European  Communities, 
Strasbourg,  February  10,  1971,  21  pages 
.................................................................... free 
Franco  Maria  Malfatti's  presentation  of the 
Commission's  1970  General  Report  to  the 
European  Parliament outlining the Commis-
sion's activities during 1970 and program for 
1971. 
PUBLIC FINANCING OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
MENT  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES  1967-
1970.  Research  and  Development  No.  I, 
Commission  of the  European Communities, 
Luxembourg, September 1970, 120 pages  ..... 
................................................................  $2.00 
English text of study announced in European 
Community No. 139. Study of public expen-
diture  for  research  and development in  the 
countries of the  Community  in  1967,  1968, 
and 1969. Figures  are broken down into 12 
major areas of expenditure. Also shows con-
tributions  to  multilateral  and  bilateral  pro-
grams. 
LES  ENTREPRISES  SIDERURGIQUES  DE  LA  COM-
MUNAUTE.  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities, Brussels, 1970, 141  pages 
................................................................  $2.40 
New edition of the Commission's  Jist  of steel 
mills.  Gi1·es  addresses,  telephone,  and  telex 
numbers of mills and sales offices.  Also  lists 
products produced by each firm. 
THE UNITED STATES  AND  THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY:  THEIR COMMON  INTEREST. Manhat-
tan  Publishing  Company,  New York,  1971, 
64  pages  .................................................... free 
Presents  facts  and  figures  about  U.S.-Cam-
mon Market trade and economic relations. It 
also  examines  the  political  and  economic 
stakes  involved  in  continued  trans-Atlantic 
cooperation. Some of the problem areas ana-
lyzed are: the Common Market's agricultural 
policy,  Britain's  entry  into  the  Community, 
preferential  agreements  with  developing  na-
tions,  non-tariff  barriers, generalized  prefer-
ences,  and  protectionist  tendencies  on  both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
ADDRESS  BY  PROFESSOR DAHRENDORF,  MEMBER 
OF  THE COMMISSION OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COM-
MUNITIES,  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  . 
Commission  of the  European Communities, 
Luxembourg, January, 1971, 20 pages ... .free 
Full text of speech  from  which the article on 
page  00  was adapted. 
TABLEAUX  COMPARATIFS  DES  REGIMES  DE 
SECURITE  SOCIAL£  APPLICABLES  DANS  LES 
ETATS  MEMBRES  DES  COMMUNAUTES  EURO-
PEENNES:  REGIME  GENERAL.  Commission  of 
the  European  Communities,  Brussels,  1970, 
84  pages .................................................... $.60 
Sixth edition, covering the situation in  social 
security as of July I, 1970. Contains synoptic 
tables  comparing  the  social  security  regula-
tions  in  force  in  the  Community's  member 
states.  Includes  explanatory  notes  on  each 
branch  of social  security  and  describes  the 
legislation governing benefits,  conditions un-
der  which  benefits are  granted,  and current 
rates in  operation. 
CONSEQUENCES BUDGET  AIRES ECONOMIQUES ET 
SOCIALES  DE  L'HARMONISATION  DES  TAUX  DE 
LA  TVA  DANS  LA  CEE.  Serie  Concurrence  et 
Rapprochment de Legislations No.  16,  Com-
mission of the European Communities, Brus-
sels,  1970, 92 pages .............................. _ $2.00 
A vailable  in  French  and  German.  Study 
made for the Commission by the Europa In-
stitute,  University  of  the  Netherlands  at 
Utrecht,  under  the  direction  of  Professors 
J.  G.  Detiger,  C.  J.  Cart,  and P.  VerLoren 
van  Themaat.  Analysis  of  the  budgetary, 
economic,  and social  effects  of the  applica-
tion of TV  A (tax on value-added) in fhe  Com-
munity's  member states.  Special attention  is 
given  to  the Netherlands which  is  used as  a 
model and analyzed quantitatively. Also dis-
cusses  the  consequence  for  the  retail  and 
wholesale  trades as  well as  fiscal  autonomy. 
LA  POLITIQUE  DU  MARCH£  OBLIGATAIRE  DANS 
LES PAYS  DE  LA CEE. Monetary Committee of 
the  European  Communities,  Brussels,  Octo-
ber 1970, 196 pages ................................  $2.00 
Available  in  French  and  German.  Study 
made  by  a  group  of  experts  on  securities 
LA  POLITIQUE  DU  MARCH£  OBLIGATAIRE  DANS 
markets, under the direction of F. de Vo{?hel, 
Deputy  Governor of the  National  Bank  of 
Belgium,  for  the  Community's  Monetary 
Committee. Describes the procedures and in-
struments used to  ensure  equilibrium on the 
bond markets of Common  Market and ana-
lyzes the policies which  these member states 
pursued  from  1966  to mid-1969.  Includes  a 
detailed statistical annex on the Community's 
bond markets. 
THE  COMMON  MARKET  AND  THE  COMMON 
MAN.  European  Communities  Information 
Service, Brussels,  1970, 32 pages ............  free 
July  1970 revised edition. Reviews the social 
policy  of  the  European  Community.  Dis-
cusses  incomes,  living standards,  and social 
security. A /so  gi1•es a short description of in-
dustrial relations and the  trade-union  move-
ment in  relation  to the  Rome Treaty  estab-
lishing the European Economic Community. 
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